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Abstract
We analyze non-price advertising by retail rms, when the rms are privately informed about
their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium
exists in which lower-cost rms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed
consumers rationally employ an advertising search rule in which they buy from the highest-
advertising rm, since lower-cost rms also select lower prices. In a repeated advertising game,
colluding rms face a tradeo¤: the use of advertising can promote productive e¢ ciency but
only if su¢ cient current or future advertising expenses are incurred. At one extreme, if rms
pool at zero advertising, they sacrice productive e¢ ciency but also eliminate current and
future advertising expenses. Focusing on symmetric perfect public equilibria for the repeated
advertising game, we establish conditions under which optimal collusion entails pooling at zero
advertising. More generally, full or partial pooling is observed in optimal collusion. Such
collusive agreements reduce consumer welfare, since they restrict informed consumersability to
locate the lowest available price in the market.
Bagwell: Donald L. Lucas Professor of Economics, Stanford University; Senior Fellow at SIEPR
and SCID; and NBER Research Associate. Lee: School of Economics, Singapore Management
University. We thank two anonymous referees, Yeon-Koo Che, Pauline Ippolito, Jeong-Yoo Kim,
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also thank seminar participants at EARIE, ENPC-CERAS, EUI, the Far Eastern Meeting of
the Econometric Society, Singapore Management University, and Southern Methodist University
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entitled Advertising and Collusion in Retail Markets,dated June 2008. The dynamic analysis
from the earlier paper is now found here, and the static analysis from the earlier paper is now
found in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009). Lee gratefully acknowledges Singapore
Management University research fund.
1 Introduction
Modern theoretical analyses of collusion emphasize collusion in prices or quantities. This emphasis
is appropriate for many applications; however, collusion may also occur with respect to instruments
of non-price competition. One possibility of particular interest is that rms select their advertising
levels in a collusive fashion. This possibility has not received signicant theoretical attention.1
One reason may be that the empirical literature on collusion and advertising o¤ers somewhat
mixed ndings.2 Ferguson (1974) argues that advertising activity is publicly observable and thus
that collusion in advertising is feasible; and Cable (1972), Greer (1971) and Sutton (1974) emphasize
the possibility of collusion in advertising among rms in highly concentrated markets, in their
interpretations of the empirical relationship between advertising and concentration. Simon (1970)
and Scherer (1980), however, argue that advertising activities are di¢ cult to assess and monitor,
and thus suggest that collusion in advertising may be di¢ cult to achieve. More recently, Gasmi,
La¤ont and Vuong (1992) argue that Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola colluded in advertising and possibly
price over a sample period that covers the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Kadiyali (1996) reports
evidence that Kodak and Fuji colluded in price and advertising in the U.S. photographic lm
industry in the 1980s. But Symeonidis (2000) reports an absence of collusion in non-price variables
like advertising in his study of U.K. manufacturing cartels.
In the specic context of retail markets, however, some interesting empirical relationships be-
tween advertising and prices have been identied. In his classic study of the retail eyeglass industry
in the U.S. in the 1960s, Benham (1972) compares transaction prices under di¤erent legal systems:
prices were higher in states that prohibited all advertising than in states that had no restrictions
on advertising; in addition, prices were only slightly higher in states that allowed just non-price
advertising than in states that also allowed price advertising. Apparently, the ability to advertise
even in only a non-price form is sometimes associated with lower prices. Similar ndings are re-
ported by Cady (1976) in his analysis of the U.S. retail market for prescription drugs in 1970. This
work suggests the possibility that retail rms might sometimes gain if they are able to limit the use
of non-price advertsing. Of course, retail rms directly achieve an agreement to limit advertising
when a state law prohibits advertising.3 In the absence of such a state law, retail rms may interact
repeatedly and seek to achieve a self-enforcing agreement to limit advertising.
Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) o¤er an equilibrium interpretation of Benhams ndings. They de-
velop a complete-information model of retail competition, in which some consumers are informed
1For exceptions, see Friedman (1983) and Stigler (1968). Friedman characterizes open-loop Nash equilibria in a
repeated game of advertising and quantity competition, while Stigler compares cartels that collude in advertising
and compete in price with those that collude in price and compete in advertising. See also Nocke (2007) for a
recent analysis of collusive equilibria in a dynamic game of investment, where investment may be thought of as
quality-improving R&D or persuasive advertising.
2For a comprehensive survey of the economic analysis of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
3Alternatively, retail rms might achieve such an agreement by forming a professional association that imposes
advertising restrictions on its members. The FTC has argued that anti-competitive e¤ects may be associated with
price and non-price advertising restrictions imposed by a professional association. See California Dental Association
v. Federal Trade Commission (1999).
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and can identify the highest-advertising rm, while other consumers are uninformedand do not
observe advertising levels. All consumers possess downward-sloping demand curves and must visit a
rm in order to observe its price. Bagwell and Ramey focus on two kinds of equilibria. In a random
equilibrium, consumers ignore advertising and choose rms at random. Consequently, rms do not
advertise, and they enjoy symmetric market shares. In an advertising equilibrium, informed con-
sumers use the advertising search rule, whereby they go to the highest-advertising rm. In response
to this consumer behavior, rms employ a symmetric mixed strategy that pairs higher advertising
choices with greater investments in cost reduction and thus lower prices. Informed consumers are
then rational in using the advertising search rule. For a xed number of rms, expected prot is
higher in the random equilibrium, because advertising expenses are thereby avoided. In a free-
entry model, their ndings regarding the relationship between non-price advertising and average
transaction prices are broadly consistent with the empirical patterns that Benham reports, if the
random equilibrium is associated with a setting in which advertising is legally banned.
In this paper, we modify the Bagwell-Ramey model in two key respects. First, we assume that
rms have private information as to their respective production costs. In particular, we consider
an incomplete-information model with a continuum of possible cost types, where cost types are
iid across rms. In the corresponding static game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which
lower-cost rms advertise more and price lower than do higher-cost rms. Informed consumers
are again rational in using the advertising search rule. The advertising equilibrium may then be
compared with the random equilibrium in which no rm advertises and consumers pick a rm
at random.4 Second, we assume that rms interact repeatedly over an innite horizon, where
advertising selections are publicly observed by rms and each rms cost type is iid over time.
With this second modication, we may consider any self-enforcing collusive agreement among rms.
Thus, in our modied model, the search for an optimal collusive equilibrium among rms entails
signicantly more than a particular comparison between the random and advertising equilibria.
Assuming that informed consumers use the advertising search rule in each period, we focus on
the symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE) of our repeated advertising game. For this class
of equilibria, our goal is to characterize the optimal form of collusion in advertising among rms.5
We note that the SPPE solution concept includes a wide range of behaviors. Firms may repeatedly
play the (non-cooperative) advertising equilibrium of the static game, and patient rms may also
enforce zero advertising in all periods. In the latter case, collusion among rms is used to implement
repeatedly the random equilibrium. The random equilibrium is then achieved as a self-enforcing
ban on advertising rather than as a consequence of a legal ban on advertising. Patient rms may
also implement other stationary advertising strategies, including advertising schedules that take
4 In our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009), we compare the advertising equilibrium with the random
equilibrium, both when the number of rms is xed and when the number of rms is endogenous under free entry,
and we thereby consider the short- and long-run implications of advertising competition for consumer surplus, rm
prot and social welfare. We also analyze a benchmark model of price competition and compare the corresponding
pricing equilibrium with the advertising equilibrium.
5 In the stage game, sequential search is not allowed, and rms are thus able to select their respective monopoly
prices. We therefore embed monopoly pricing into the prot functions and focus on collusion in advertising.
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the form of step functions. A further possibility is that rms implement non-stationary SPPE, in
which they move between cooperative and war phases in their advertising conduct.
When rms collude in private-information settings, two kinds of incentive constraints arise.6
First, each rm must not gain by undertaking an on-schedule deviation, whereby a rm with
one cost type deviates and mimics the behavior that is prescribed for this rm when it has a
di¤erent cost type. The on-schedule incentive constraint is analogous to the standard truth-telling
constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems. An important feature of an on-schedule
deviation is that no other rm would be aware that a deviation actually occurred, since other
rms would infer that the rm drew the cost type for which the observed behavior is prescribed
in equilibrium. The second kind of deviation is called an o¤-schedule deviation.An o¤-schedule
deviation occurs when a rm takes an action that is not specied in equilibrium for any of its
possible cost types. Importantly, an o¤-schedule deviation is publicly observed as a deviation. As
in standard repeated games, an o¤-schedule deviation is punished harshly; thus, su¢ ciently patient
rms will not undertake o¤-schedule deviations.
Colluding rms face interesting trade-o¤s when selecting an optimal collusive scheme. Suppose
rms contemplate the repeated use of the advertising equilibrium of the static game. An advantage
of this scheme is that it maximizes productive e¢ ciency: in each period, lower-cost rms advertise
at strictly higher levels, and so the informed consumers are allocated to the lowest-cost rm. A
disadvantage of this scheme, however, is that rmsprots are reduced by high advertising expendi-
tures. Firms may thus look for some way to keep the productive-e¢ ciency advantage while reducing
advertising expenditures. They might thus consider a strictly decreasing advertising schedule that
is atterand involves lower levels of advertising. Such a schedule, however, will induce higher-
cost types to raise their advertising and mimic lower-cost types, unless higher advertising selections
result in some future cost. Given our focus on SPPE, any future cost must be experienced symmet-
rically by all rms. The future cost may thus take the form of a future advertising warin which
higher and less protable advertising schedules are employed. This discussion points to two general
themes. First, there is a substitutability between current-period advertising and future advertising
wars. Second, the productive-e¢ ciency benets that are associated with sorting can be enjoyed
only if the informational cost of high current or future advertising levels is also experienced.
Our formal analysis builds on these themes. We show that an optimal SPPE always exists that
is stationary (i.e., that does not use wars). This result holds for any demand function and for any
distribution function of cost types. We thus conrm at a general level that future advertising wars
are a redundant instrument: rms cannot achieve higher prots with a non-stationary SPPE than
with a stationary SPPE. We also characterize an optimal SPPE that is stationary. In particular,
if the distribution function is log-concave and the demand function is su¢ ciently inelastic, then an
optimal SPPE for su¢ ciently patient rms entails pooling at zero advertising for all cost types in all
periods. We also strengthen this nding and establish that, under the same conditions, any optimal
SPPE is stationary and entails pooling at zero advertising by all cost types in all periods. Thus,
6The discussion here follows Athey et al. (2004) and Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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while our SPPE solution concept allows for a wide range of behaviors, we show that important
conditions exist under which advertising behavior in any optimal SPPE of our repeated game takes
a remarkably simple form: along the equilibrium path, no rm advertises in any period.
When rms collude in this way, the welfare of consumers is reduced below that which they enjoy
in the advertising equilibrium of the static game. Intuitively, in our model, the induced distribution
of posted prices is independent of the advertising selections of rms. This means that uninformed
consumers enjoy the same consumer surplus whether or not rms eliminate non-price advertising.
In the advertising equilibrium, however, informed consumers use non-price advertising to infer the
identity of the lowest-cost, and thus the lowest-price, rm in the market. The average transaction
price is thus increased when rms collude and eliminate non-price advertising. Collusion of this
kind thus acts to reduce the welfare of informed consumers.
We emphasize that the characterization of optimal collusive conduct described above requires
patient rms and assumes su¢ ciently inelastic demand. Firms must be patient in order to resist
undertaking an o¤-schedule deviation and advertising a positive amount. For patient rms, the
immediate gain in prot would be overwhelmed by the loss in future prot that would ensue. For
example, such a deviation might trigger reversion to the advertising equilibrium of the static game
in all future periods. Likewise, for other demand functions, optimal SPPE may not entail zero
advertising by all types. We thus also characterize optimal SPPE behavior under general demand
functions. Requiring su¢ ciently patient rms, we establish three additional ndings.
First, for any demand function, if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then
any optimal SPPE entails pooling at zero advertising by all types in all periods. Second, for any
demand function and for any distribution function of cost types, any optimal SPPE involves at least
partial pooling; in particular, any optimal SPPE entails pooling at the bottom and at the top (i.e.,
on intervals of cost types adjoining the lowest-cost and highest-cost types).7 This second nding
ensures that, under general conditions, an optimal SPPE for patient rms strictly improves upon
the repeated use of the static advertising equilibrium in which advertising is strictly decreasing
in cost type. Third, for a large family of demand and distribution functions, we show that any
optimal SPPE uses at most two pooling intervals: it is characterized by either one pooling step at
zero advertising or two pooling steps at the bottom and at the top, with or without an intermediate
sorting interval. Firms limit the number of pooling steps to diminish advertising expenses. Again,
such collusive agreements harm consumer welfare, since they restrict informed consumersability
to locate the lowest available price in the market.
Our analysis of the repeated advertising game is closely related to work by Athey et al. (2004).8
They consider a repeated game in which rms have private cost shocks and collude in pricing.
7When an optimal SPPE entails positive advertising for some cost types, we may generate the associated payo¤s
using a stationary or non-stationary SPPE. The reason is that rms may then allocate advertising expenses across
periods, because of the substitutability between current-period advertising and future advertising wars.
8See also McAfee and McMillan (1992) for a related theory of identical bidding among collusive bidders. They
develop their results for a rst-price auction in a static model. Our model of advertising is analogous to an all-pay
auction, and we also present a dynamic analysis. For other analyses of repeated games with private information in
which SPPE are analyzed, see Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Hanazono and Yang (2007) and Lee (2007, 2009).
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The game considered by Athey et al. may be thought of as a repeated rst-price (procurement)
auction, while the repeated advertising game that we analyze here is analogous to a repeated all-pay
auction. In their paper, when the distribution of cost types is log-concave, if demand is su¢ ciently
inelastic and rms are su¢ ciently patient, then rms always select the same price, regardless of
their respective cost types, along the equilibrium path of any optimal SPPE. As described above,
we establish a similar nding in our model of collusion in advertising. As well, we report that
any optimal SPPE for patient rms is stationary and entails pooling at zero advertising, even for
elastic demand functions, if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small.9 For a large
family of demand and distribution functions, we also show that an optimal SPPE entails at most
two pooling intervals. Finally, Athey et al. also show that, if demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, then
an optimal SPPE exists that is stationary. In our model of collusion in advertising, for general
demand functions, an optimal SPPE exists that is stationary.
In other related work, Peters (1984) and LeBlanc (1998) consider the e¤ects of a prohibition
on price advertising in models where each rm is privately informed about its production cost.
By contrast, here we emphasize that rms can achieve a self-enforcing restriction on non-price
advertising. Also, Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) consider a duopoly model in which one rm has
private information as to whether its costs are high or low. In a static setting, they show that
non-price advertising may be used to signal low costs and thus low prices. In the current paper,
by contrast, we adopt a continuum-type model in which all rms are privately informed as to their
costs. In a dynamic setting where restrictions on non-price advertising must be self-enforced, we
show that rms often have incentive to restrict the use of non-price advertising.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the static advertising game. The repeated
game is examined in Section 3. Optimal collusion for patient rms is characterized in Section 4.
Section 5 characterizes the critical discount factor above which optimal SPPE entail pooling at
zero advertising or two pooling intervals. Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix, we discuss the
robustness of our analysis and provide additional proofs.
2 The Static Advertising Game
We begin with a static game in which rms compete through advertising for market share. Firms
are privately informed as to their respective costs, and each rms advertising choice may signal
its costs, and thus its price, to those consumers who are informed of advertising activities. We
establish the existence of two kinds of equilibria, advertising and random equilibria, and compare
the expected prots earned by rms under these two equilibria. Our analysis of the advertising
game of the static model is developed further in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009).
9We also consider the case of a uniform distribution of types and a demand function whose elasticity is constant
and above unity. If the elasticity of demand does not exceed a critical level, then any optimal SPPE for patient rms
is again stationary and entails pooling at zero advertising.
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2.1 The Model
We assume N  2 ex ante identical rms. The rms compete for sales in a homogeneous-good
market, and each rm i is privately informed of its unit cost level i. Firm is cost type i is drawn
from the support [; ] according to the twice-continuously di¤erentiable distribution function, F (),
where  >   0. Cost types are iid across rms. We dene the density as f()  F 0(), where
f() > 0 for all  2 [; ]. After rms observe their individual cost types, the rms simultaneously
choose their prices and levels of advertising. We follow Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) and assume
that advertising is a dissipative expense that does not directly a¤ect consumer demand.
The market contains a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer has a twice-continuously di¤er-
entiable demand function D(p) that satises D(p) > 0 > D0(p) over the relevant range of prices p.
We assume that prices cannot be directly communicated in the market; in particular, consumers
cannot observe prices prior to picking a rm to visit and from which to purchase. Consumers are
divided into two groups. A fraction I of consumers are informed in the sense that they observe
rmsadvertising expenses.10 Based on this information, informed consumers form beliefs as to
rmscost types and employ a visitation (search) strategy. For instance, informed consumers may
use an advertising search rule, in which a consumer goes to the highest-advertising rm.11 The
remaining fraction U = 1  I of consumers do not observe advertising expenditures and are unin-
formed. Uninformed consumers may adopt a random search rule, whereby a consumer randomly
chooses which rm to visit.
We now dene the following advertising game: (i) rms learn their own cost types, (ii) rms
make simultaneous choices of advertising and price, and (iii) given any advertising information,
each consumer chooses a rm to visit, observes that rms price and makes desired purchases given
this price. Observe that a consumer can visit only one rm.12 As we explain below, this assumption
simplies our analysis, since it ensures that each rm chooses the monopoly price that is associated
with its cost type for any sales it makes.
For the advertising game of the static model, we are interested in Perfect Bayesian Equilibria.
We impose two additional requirements on our solution concept. First, we restrict attention to
equilibria in which consumers do not condition their visitation decision on rmsnames.Thus,
uninformed consumers must use the random search rule, and, for any given vector of rm advertising
levels, informed consumers must treat symmetrically any two rms which advertise at the same
level. We note that informed consumers satisfy this requirement when they use the advertising
search rule. Second, we restrict attention to equilibria in which rms use symmetric pricing and
advertising strategies. Observe that the random search rule is indeed an optimal search strategy
10 It is not essential that informed consumers observe all advertising expenditures. All of our results hold if informed
consumers observe only the identity of the highest-advertising rm(s).
11 If more than one rm advertises at the highest level, then the advertising search rule requires that informed
consumers choose randomly among the highest-advertising rms.
12 In our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009), we develop a modied advertising model in which consumers
can undertake costly sequential search and rms choose advertising levels and prices. We establish the existence of
an advertising equilibrium and show that the possibility of sequential search serves to strengthen our main nding
that rms may achieve higher expected prot when they restrict the use of advertising.
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for uninformed consumers, when rms use symmetric pricing strategies.
Using our symmetry requirement, we can dene a pure advertising strategy for rm i as a
function A(i) that maps from the set of cost types [; ] to the set of possible advertising expen-
ditures R+  [0;1). Abusing notation somewhat, let the vector A( i) denote the advertising
selections of rms other than i when these rms all use the schedule A and their cost types are
given by the (N   1)-tuple  i. For any given search rule used by informed consumers, rm is
market share is determined by the vector of advertising levels selected by rm i and its rivals.
Thus, the market share for rm i maps from RN+ to [0; 1] and in equilibrium may be represented
as m(A(i);A( i)).13 Note that, under our rst requirement above, rm is market share is not
indexed by i and thus does not depend on rm is name. Thus, if rm i has cost type i, advertises
at level A(i) and anticipates that its rivals employ the strategy A to determine their advertising
levels, then its interim-stage market share is given by M(A(i);A)  E i [m(A(i);A( i))].
We next dene a rms expected prot. Let r(p; )  (p   )D(p) denote a rms net revenue
(excluding advertising expenses) when it has cost type , sets the price p and sells to the entire
unit mass of consumers. We assume r(p; ) is strictly concave in p with a unique maximizer
p() = argmaxp r(p; ). The monopoly price p() then strictly increases in  whereas r(p(); )
strictly decreases in . We also assume p() > , so that the price at the top has a positive
margin. Using our requirement that all consumers, and specically uninformed consumers, treat
all rms symmetrically, we conclude that all rms must receive positive expected market share. In
the equilibria upon which we focus, therefore, each rm must select the monopoly price given its
cost type. We may thus embed the monopoly price into the revenue function and dene the interim-
stage net revenue for rm i by R(A(i); i;A)  r(p(i); i)M(A(i);A). We further simplify our
notation by ignoring subscript i. If a rm of type  picks an advertising level A(b) when its rivals
employ the strategy A to determine their advertising levels, then its interim-stage prot is
(A(b); ;A)  r(p(); )M(A(b);A) A(b): (1)
 R(A(b); ;A) A(b):
With our additional requirements embedded, we now dene an equilibrium as an advertising
strategy A, a belief function and search rules for consumers that collectively satisfy three remaining
conditions. First, given the market share function, m, that is induced by consumerssearch rules,
the advertising strategy A is such that, for all , A() 2 argmaxa [R(a; ;A)  a].14 Second, given
an observed advertising level a by a rm, informed consumers use BayesRule whenever possible
(i.e., whenever a = A() for some  2 [; ]) in forming their beliefs as to that rms cost type 
13For example, if all consumers use the random search rule, then m(A(i);A( i)) = 1N . If instead the unin-
formed consumers use the random search rule while the informed consumers use the advertising search rule, then
m(A(i);A( i)) = I + UN if A(i) > A(j) for all j 6= i, while m(A(i);A( i)) = UN if A(i) < A(j) for some
j 6= i. For this latter set of consumer search strategies, if rm i ties with k  1 other rms for the highest advertising
level, then m(A(i);A( i)) = Ik +
U
N
.
14Notice that A() must be an optimal choice for a rm with type  in comparison to advertising deviations that
are on-schedule (i.e., a such that a = A(b) 6= A() for some b 2 [; ]) as well as o¤-schedule (i.e., a such that
a 6= A() for any  2 [; ]).
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and thus price p(). Third, for any observed vector of advertising levels, given their beliefs, the
informed consumerssearch rule directs them to the rm or rms with the lowest expected price.
For a given equilibrium, a rm of type  advertises at level A(). We can thus express the rms
expected revenue and prot, respectively, as ER(A(); ;A) and E[R(A(); ;A)   A()], where
the implicit market share functions are determined by the equilibrium search rules of informed con-
sumers. In the next subsection, we restrict attention to equilibria in which consumer use particular
search rules. Equilibrium market share functions may then be explicitly and simply represented.
2.2 Advertising and Random Equilibria
In this subsection, we establish the existence of two kinds of equilibria. In an advertising equilib-
rium, informed consumers use the advertising search rule. Since p() is strictly increasing, such
equilibria can exist only if the advertising schedule A is nonincreasing, so that higher-advertising
rms have lower costs and thus o¤er lower prices. In a random equilibrium, informed consumers
ignore advertising and use the random search rule. A random equilibrium thus can exist only if
rms maximize expected prots and do not advertise (i.e., A  0).
We rst consider advertising equilibria. In such an equilibrium, rms use an advertising strategy
A(), informed consumers use the advertising search rule, and uninformed consumers are randomly
distributed across all N rms. Since r(p(); ) is strictly decreasing, lower-cost rms enjoy market
share expansion more than do higher-cost rms. As the cost of advertising at any level is indepen-
dent of a rms cost type, we can thus easily show that equilibrium interim-stage market share,
M(A();A), must be nonincreasing in a rms cost type, .15 This implies in turn that A() is also
nonincreasing in , since at the interim stage no rm would be willing to advertise more in order
to receive (weakly) less market share. Further, given the advertising search rule, A() cannot be
constant over any interval of types: by increasing its advertising an innitesimal amount, a rm
with a type on this interval would experience a discrete gain in its expected market share. Thus,
A() must be strictly decreasing, which implies that M(A();A) = UN + [1   F ()]N 1I. Given
M(A();A) = UN , a rm with type  will select zero advertising, and so A() = 0.
These necessary conditions for an advertising equilibrium are developed in further detail in our
companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009). We establish there also the following existence result:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique advertising equilibrium in which A() is strictly decreasing
and di¤erentiable and satises A() = 0.
The advertising equilibrium acts as a fully sorting (separating) mechanism: rms truthfully
reveal their cost types along the downward-sloping advertising schedule. Informed consumers ra-
tionally employ the advertising search rule, since the lowest-cost rm advertises the most and also
15This discussion reects the underlying single-crossing property that holds in the model. When a rm increases its
advertising level, it confronts a trade o¤ between the larger advertising expense, a, and the consequent higher expected
market share, M(a;A). Holding the interim-stage prot constant, the slope da=dM(a;A) is given by r(p(); ), which
is strictly decreasing in .
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o¤ers the lowest price. Thus, ostensibly uninformative advertising directs market share to the
lowest-cost supplier and promotes productive e¢ ciency.
We next consider the random equilibrium, wherein all consumers use the random search rule
and thus divide up evenly across rms. Given the random search rule, each rm receives an equal
share, 1N , of the unit mass of consumers. Thus, M(A();A) =
1
N in a random equilibrium. Each
rm thus chooses zero advertising in a random equilibrium, since even informed consumers are
unresponsive to advertising. In addition, when rms pool and do not advertise, the random search
rule is a best response for each consumer.16 The random equilibrium thus exists and takes the form
of a pooling equilibrium.
Bagwell and Lee (2009) compare expected consumer surplus in these two equilibria. Given
that the induced distribution of monopoly prices is not altered across the two equilibria, uniformed
consumers expect the same consumer surplus whether the advertising or random equilibrium is an-
ticipated. Informed consumers, however, expect strictly higher consumer surplus in the advertising
equilibrium than in the random equilibrium. The key point is that, in the advertising equilibrium,
informed consumers can infer the identity of the lowest-cost, and thus the lowest-price, rm.
Bagwell and Lee also compare the expected prots earned by rms in these equilibria. The
comparison is subtle: the advertising equilibrium achieves productive e¢ ciency while the random
equilibrium does not; however, the random equilibrium also avoids all advertising expenses. They
show that rms make a strictly higher expected prot in the random equilibrium than in the ad-
vertising equilibrium, if F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic or if the support of
possible cost types is su¢ ciently small. This result suggests that important circumstances exist
under which retail rms would benet from a restriction on non-price retail advertising. As our
discussion of the random equilibrium conrms, advertising would not be used if informed consumers
were to ignore it. If informed consumers were responsive to advertising, however, then rms might
nevertheless achieve such a restriction on advertising if advertising were legally prohibited. Finally,
even if advertising is legal and informed consumers are responsive to advertising, rms may be able
to eliminate advertising as part of an optimal self-enforcing collusive agreement. In our analysis of
the repeated game below, generalizing beyond the particular comparison between the advertising
and random equilibria, we conrm this possibility by showing that rms may prefer zero advertis-
ing to any other self-enforcing advertising scheme. Such a collusive agreement, however, reduces
expected consumer surplus by eliminating the ability of informed consumers to locate the lowest
available price in the market.
16 If informed consumers observe a deviation whereby some rm selects positive advertising, then random search
remains optimal in the event that informed consumers believe that the deviating rm has an average type. Since
such a deviation may be more attractive to a lower-cost type, the random equilibrium may fail to be a rened
equilibrium in the static model. See Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) for an analysis of the rened equilibrium in a static
model of advertising in which one rm has two possible cost types. In the repeated game that we analyze below,
the random equilibrium is achieved as a self-enforcing ban on advertising in which a deviation from zero advertising
would cause a future advertising war.
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3 The Repeated Advertising Game
We consider next a repeated game in which rms select advertising levels and are privately informed
with respect to their realized cost levels in each period. We assume that informed consumers use
the advertising search rule. In this section, we dene the repeated game and present some programs
that are useful in the next section where we characterize optimal collusion for rms.
3.1 The Model
We now dene the repeated game. In each of an innite number of periods, rms play the static
advertising game dened in Section 2. We assume henceforth that, in each period, informed con-
sumers use the advertising search rule. Uninformed consumers again use the random search rule.
As explained in Section 2, these search rules are optimal in a given period if rms use symmetric
strategies and lower-cost types always advertise at (weakly) higher levels. As discussed in more
detail below, for the equilibrium concept that we employ, these requirements for rmsstrategies
are satised. Hence, in our formal denitions of the repeated game and the equilibrium concept,
we may simplify and focus exclusively on the behavior of rms.
Upon entering a period, rms share a public history, in that each rm observes the realized
advertising expenditures of all rms in all previous periods. A rm also privately observes its
current cost type. As well, each rm privately observes the history of the cost types that it had,
the prices that it selected and the advertising schedules that it used in previous periods. Thus, we
consider a setting in which a rm does not observe any rival rms current or past cost types and
also does not observe any rival rms current or past advertising schedules. In addition, a rm does
not observe the realized price choice of any rival in any past period.17
The vectors of cost types, advertising schedules and realized advertisements at date t are denoted
t  (it; it); At  (Ait;A it) and at  (ait;a it). Under the assumed consumer search rules,
let mi(at) denote the market share received by rm i when the advertising vector at is used. Then,
an innite sequence ft;Atg1t=1 generates a path-wise payo¤ for rm i:
ui(ft;Atg1t=1) =
1X
t=1
t 1 [r (p (it) ; it)mi(at)  ait] ; (2)
where ait = Ait(it) and  2 (0; 1) denotes the common discount factor for rms. Notice that we
embed the monopoly price selection into the net revenue function, r. This simplies the analysis
and is without loss of generality given our assumption that past prices are not public among rms.
As in the static model, we assume that cost shocks are iid across rms. For the repeated game, we
introduce as well the assumption that cost shocks are iid over time.18 With this assumption, the
17 In the Appendix, we discuss the robustness of our analysis when this assumption is relaxed. We argue there that
forces in favor of pooling remain, even when prices are public.
18 In practice, production costs may consist of several components that are private. Some components, such as
the price of certain raw materials or the productivity of some factors, may uctuate in a transitory way, whereas
other components, such as the details of long-term contracts with suppliers, may have a more persistent inuence on
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repeated game takes a recursive structure.
As our solution concept, we employ Perfect Public Equilibrium (Fudenberg et al., 1994). We
thus focus on public strategies. A rm uses a public strategy when a rms current advertising level
depends on its current cost level and the public history of realized advertising levels. At the close of
date  , the public history of realized advertisements is h = fatgt=1. Let H be the set of potential
public histories at date  . A public strategy for rm i in period  , si , is a mapping from H 1 to
the set of stage-game strategies fA j A : [; ] ! R+g. For simplicity, we assume that any stage-
game strategy A is continuously di¤erentiable except at perhaps a nite number of points where A
jumps. A public strategy for rm i, si, is then a sequence fsitg1t=1, and a prole of public strategies
is s = fs1; :::; sNg. We restrict attention to Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibrium (SPPE), whereby
s = s1 = ::: = sN . Thus, in an SPPE, rms adopt symmetric advertising schedules after every
history: si (h 1) = sj (h 1) for all i; j;  and h 1.
3.2 Dynamic Programming Approach
Building on work by Abreu et al. (1986, 1990), we apply a dynamic programming approach to
our recursive setting. Let V  R be the set of SPPE values. Note that, at this point, we have
not established supV 2 V or inf V 2 V . Following Abreu et al., any symmetric public strategy
prole s = fs; :::; sg can be factored into two components: a rst-period advertising schedule A
and a continuation-value function v : RN+ ! R. The continuation-value function describes the
repeated-game expected payo¤ enjoyed by all rms as evaluated at the beginning of period two,
before period-two cost types are realized. This payo¤ is allowed to depend on the rst-period
advertising realization a  (a1; :::; aN ) 2 RN+ .
Under this approach, for any given symmetric public strategy prole s, we may ignore subscript
i (as in the static model) and denote the interim-stage rst-period prot for rm i of type  as
(A(); ;A)  R(A(); ;A)   A(). At the interim-stage in the rst period, rm is expected
continuation value may be denoted as v(A();A)  E i [v(A();A( i))], where A( i) denotes
the (N   1)-tuple of advertising selections by rms other than i when these rms all use the
schedule A. We may now use (A(); ;A) + v(A();A) to represent a rms interim-stage payo¤
from a symmetric public strategy prole s. A rms expected payo¤ from s is then given as
E [(A(); ;A) + v(A();A)].
The set of optimal SPPE can be characterized by solving a factored program.In particular,
we may choose an advertising schedule and a continuation-value function to maximize the expected
payo¤ to a rm subject to feasibility and incentive constraints.
Factored Program: The program chooses an advertising schedule A and a continuation-value
production costs. Our assumption of transitory shocks simplies the analysis considerably, since otherwise a rms
current advertising choice could signal its cost and thereby a¤ect the beliefs that rival rms carry into the following
period. Athey and Bagwell (2008) consider a model of price collusion in the case where production costs are persistent
over time and privately observed.
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function v to maximize
E [(A(); ;A) + v(A();A)]
subject to: (i) for all a, v(a) 2 V , and (ii) for any deviation bA,
E [(A(); ;A) + v(A();A)]  E[( bA(); ;A) + v( bA();A)]:
A key implication of the dynamic programming approach is that the set of optimal SPPE can be
characterized by solving the Factored Program. Specically, let s = fs; :::; sg be a symmetric
public strategy prole with the corresponding factorization (A; v). Then, s is an optimal SPPE
if and only if (A; v) solves the Factored Program.
We next follow Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004), who show that existing tools
from (static) mechanism design theory can be used to nd the optimal factorization. To this end,
we rewrite the Factored Program as an Interim Program. The latter program utilizes interim-stage
prot and parses the incentive constraint into two kinds: (i) the on-scheduleconstraint that each
rm truthfully announces its cost and (ii) the o¤-scheduleconstraint that each rm cannot gain
by choosing an advertising level that is not assigned to any cost type.
Interim Program: The program chooses A and v to maximize
E [(A(); ;A) + v(A();A)]
subject to:
(i) On-schedule incentive compatibility: 8b 6= ,
8 i; v(A(b);A( i)) 2 V
8; (A(); ;A) + v(A();A)  (A(b); ;A) + v(A(b);A)
(ii) O¤-schedule incentive compatibility: 8ba =2 A([; ]),
8 i; v(ba;A( i)) 2 V
8; (A(); ;A) + v(A();A)  (ba; ;A) + v(ba;A):
Following Athey et al. (2004), we next relax the Interim Program in two ways. First, we ignore
the o¤-schedule constraints by assuming that  is su¢ ciently high so that no o¤-schedule deviation
is protable. Second, we relax the on-schedule constraints by replacing v(A(b);A( i)) 2 V with
v(A(b);A)  supV . The relaxed constraint thus requires only that the expected continuation value
does not exceed the supremum of SPPE. When the constraints are relaxed in this way, we have the
Relaxed Program.
To facilitate connection with tools from mechanism design theory, we next re-write the Relaxed
Program using direct-form notation. Let (b; ;A)  (A(b); ;A), M(b;A)  M(A(b);A) and
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R(b; ;A)  R(A(b); ;A). We also dene W (b)  [supV   v(A(b);A)]. For instance, W (b) > 0
means that the expected continuation value falls below the value supV subsequent to a rms choice
of A(b). A continuation-value reduction represents a warthat involves an increase of advertising
expenses in the future. We may now state the Relaxed Program in terms of the choice of the
current-period advertising schedule A and the punishmentfunction W that maximizes expected
payo¤ subject to on-schedule constraints:
Relaxed Program: The program chooses A and W to maximize
E [R(; ;A) A() W ()]
subject to:
8; W ()  0
(On-IC) 8;b; R(; ;A) A() W ()  R(b; ;A) A(b) W (b):
To see that the Relaxed Program is indeed a relaxation of the Interim Program, suppose that
(A; v) satises the constraints of the Interim Program. Let us now translate (A; v) into (A;W )
via W (b)  [supV   v(A(b);A)]. Using this translation, it is now easy to conrm that (A;W )
satises the constraints of the Relaxed Program and that the Interim and Relaxed Programs rank
factorizations (A; v) in the same way. Therefore, if we nd a solution (A;W ) to the Relaxed
Program, and if that solution can be expressed as a translation of some (A; v) that satises all of
the constraints of the Interim Program, then this (A; v) is the factorization of an optimal SPPE.
Our next step is to identify an important situation in which the solution to the Relaxed Program
can be translated back into an optimal SPPE factorization.
Proposition 2. (Stationarity) Suppose that (A;W   0) solves the Relaxed Program. Then
there exists b 2 (0; 1) such that, for all   b, there exists an optimal SPPE which is stationary,
wherein rms use A after all equilibrium-path histories, and A solves the following program:
maximize E[R(; ;A) A()] subject to 8;b; R(; ;A) A()  R(b; ;A) A(b).
To prove this proposition, we follow the steps used in the proof of Proposition 2 in Athey et al.
(2004). In particular, we note two implications of the assumption that (A;W   0) solves the
Relaxed Program. First, following the discussion just above, (A; v  supV ) is then a solution
to the Interim Program, provided that this factorization satises the additional constraints of the
Interim Program. We may therefore conclude that (A; v  supV ) achieves a (weakly) higher
payo¤ than can be achieved by any SPPE factorization. Thus, E [(; ;A) +  supV ]  supV .
Second, if rms are su¢ ciently patient, then the repeated play of A in each period along the
equilibrium path, with appropriate punishments o¤ the equilibrium path, is in fact an SPPE.
Given that W   0, A satises (On-IC) on a period-by-period basis. Likewise, A satises the
on-schedule incentive constraint of the Interim Program on a period-by-period basis (i.e., when the
13
continuation value does not vary with the on-schedule advertising level). The o¤-schedule incentive
constraint of the Interim Program is also satised, provided that  is su¢ ciently high. Repeated
play of the (noncooperative) advertising equilibrium of the static game is always an SPPE of the
repeated game and may be used as the punishment that follows any o¤-schedule deviation.19 Thus,
when  is su¢ ciently high, E [(; ;A)] =(1 )  supV . Using the two inequalities, we conclude
that the repeated play of A is then an optimal SPPE: supV = E[(; ;A)]=(1  ).
Hence, if a solution of the Relaxed Program is (A;W   0), and thus does not involve wars
(i.e., is stationary), and if rms are su¢ ciently patient, then supV is in fact in V . Further, an
associated optimal SPPE can be easily characterized. Firms simply use the schedule A in each
period, where A is the solution to the static program presented in Proposition 2. This result guides
our subsequent analysis. Below, we use mechanism-design tools to characterize the (A;W ) pairs
that satisfy (On-IC) in the Relaxed Program. In the next section, we show that (A;W   0) is
always a solution to the Relaxed Program, and we also characterize A.
Consider now (On-IC) from the Relaxed Program. As the following lemma indicates, this
constraint may be stated in a more useful way.
Lemma 1. (A;W ) satises on-schedule incentive compatibility (On-IC) if and only if 8 (i) A()
is nonincreasing and (ii)
R(; ;A) A() W () = R(; ;A) A() W () +
Z 

D(p(x))M(x;A)dx: (3)
The proof of this result is standard in the mechanism-design literature and is therefore omitted.20
The lemma indicates that the interim-stage expected payo¤ for a rm with period-one type  is
comprised of a payo¤-at-the-top expression (i.e., R(; ;A)   A()  W ()) and an integral that
indicates the expected information rents for this type in the rst period.
The repeated game allows for a wide range of behaviors, even within the category of stationary
SPPE. For example, as noted, in each period of the repeated game, rms may use the advertising
equilibrium of the static model stated in Proposition 1. Further, if rms strictly prefer pooling at
zero advertising to using the advertising equilibrium of the static game and they are su¢ ciently
patient, then they can enforce a stationary SPPE in which they pool with zero advertising. Any
pooling arrangement trivially satises on-schedule incentive compatibility, and patient rms will
not deviate (o¤ schedule) to a positive advertising level if such a deviation induces a future war that
entails a reversion to the advertising equilibrium. Likewise, under appropriate conditions, stationary
SPPE exist in which rms use advertising schedules that are nonincreasing step functions. More
19We show below in Lemma 2 that A achieves strictly higher expected prot than does the advertising equilibrium
of the static game.
20To conrm that (On-IC) implies thatM(;A) is nonincreasing, we may x any two types (say, 1 and 2), express
the two (On-IC) constraints under which a rm with one type does not gain from mimicking the behavior assigned
to the other type, and then add the two constraints. Given the consumer search rules, M(;A) is nonincreasing
if and only if A() is nonincreasing. A local optimality condition, 1(b; ;A) = 0 for b = , must also hold, and
the application of an appropriate envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) thus yields (3). Together, the two
conditions are su¢ cient for (On-IC), due to the single-crossing property of the model.
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generally, stationary SPPE may entail advertising schedules with intervals of pooling as well as
intervals of separation.
4 Optimal Collusion for Patient Firms
In this section, we characterize optimal SPPE, assuming rms are su¢ ciently patient so that o¤-
schedule constraints hold. We report our ndings in ve steps. First, we show that equilibrium-path
wars are not necessary for optimal SPPE. Second, using Proposition 2, we report conditions under
which an optimal SPPE exists that is stationary, wherein rms pool at zero advertising in all
periods. Third, we show that the same conditions for the second nding ensure that any optimal
SPPE is stationary and involves pooling at zero advertising in all periods. Fourth, in a more general
setting, we show that any optimal SPPE involves at least partial pooling. Fifth, we show that an
optimal SPPE with partial pooling may involve quite a small number of pooling intervals.
4.1 No Wars
In this subsection, we establish a substitutability between current advertising and future wars, and
we thereby conclude that the relaxed program has a no-war solution, (A;W   0). Accordingly,
for su¢ ciently patient rms, we establish that wars are not necessary for optimal SPPE. When rms
are su¢ ciently patient, we may thus use the program specied in Proposition 2 to characterize the
advertising schedule that is used in an optimal and stationary SPPE.
Suppose that a scheme (A;W ) satises (On-IC) in the Relaxed Program. Then, we say that an
alternative scheme (A;W ) is point-wise equivalent to (A;W ) if the scheme satises (On-IC) and
preserves the market-share allocation and interim-stage prot: 8;
M(;A) =M(;A) and R(; ;A) A() W () = R(; ;A) A() W (). (4)
We now establish a substitutability between current advertising and future wars: for any (A;W )
that satises (On-IC), we can set A()  A()+W () and construct a no-war scheme (A;W   0)
that is point-wise equivalent to (A;W ).
Proposition 3. (Substitutability) Assume that (A;W ) satises (On-IC) in the Relaxed Pro-
gram. A no-war scheme (A;W   0) is point-wise equivalent to (A;W ) if and only if A() 
A() +W ().
Proof. The proof of necessity follows directly from the denition of point-wise equivalence. If the
no-war scheme (A;W   0) is point-wise equivalent to (A;W ), thenM(;A) =M(;A) and thus
R(; ;A) = R(; ;A). Using (4), it then follows that A() = A() +W ().
For the proof of su¢ ciency, we assume that (A;W ) satises (On-IC) and dene A by A() 
A()+W (). We must show that (A;W   0) satises (On-IC) and preserves the original market
shares and interim-stage prot under (A;W ). Observe rst that, if (A;W   0) preserves the
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original market shares, M(;A) = M(;A) for all , then it satises (On-IC) in the Relaxed
Program and preserves the original interim-stage prot in (4). Hence, it su¢ ces to show that
(A;W   0) preserves the original market shares under (A;W ). To prove this part, we decompose
the market-share allocation of (A;W ) into three components: sorting intervals, pooling intervals
and jump points. We then show that the intervals on which (A;W   0) engages in sorting
(pooling) are consistent with the intervals on which (A;W ) engages in sorting (pooling), and we
also show that (A;W ) and (A;W   0) jump at the same points.
First, suppose that (A;W ) entails sorting for  2 [1; 2]  [; ]. Using (3), we nd the interim
prot for  2 [1; 2]:
R(; ;A) A() W () = R(2; 2;A) A(2) W (2) +
Z 2

D(p(x))M(x;A)dx (5)
where M(x;A) = UN + [1  F (x)]N 1I. This equation can be rewritten as
A() +W ()  [A(2) +W (2)] =  
Z 2

r(p(x); x)[@M(x;A)=@x]dx; (6)
where @M(x;A)@x =  (N   1)[1   F (x)]N 2f(x)I < 0 for all x < . Using (6), we see that A()
dened by A()  A() +W () is strictly decreasing and thus entails sorting over  2 [1; 2].
Hence, A preserves the original market shares for  2 [1; 2]. Second, suppose that (A;W ) entails
pooling for  2 [1; 2]. In this case, we may rewrite (5) as A() +W () = A(2) +W (2). Thus,
for  2 [1; 2], A entails pooling and preserves the original market share. Third, suppose that
(A;W ) involves a jump of market-share allocation at a point b 2 [; ] such that
M(b;A) > lim sup
>bM(;A) M+(b;A): (7)
The associated limits from the right for wars and advertising are denoted by W+(b) and A+(b),
respectively. The described jump of market-share allocation at b means that A(b) > A+(b). The
level of jump is determined such that the on-schedule constraint is binding at b:
A(b) +W (b)  [A+(b) +W+(b)] = r(p(b);b)[M(b;A) M+(b;A)]: (8)
Thus, by (7) and (8), A entails a jump at b, with A(b) > A+(b).21 Given that A preserves the
original market shares in pooling or sorting intervals, the level of jump under A is made such that
the on-schedule constraint is binding at b. 
Proposition 3 identies a substitutability between current advertising expenditures and future
advertising wars. When a scheme (A;W ) satises (On-IC) and requires a war (W () > 0 for some
21 In general, if (A;W ) satises (On-IC), then M(;A) must be nonincreasing. As no type would paymore for
less market share, incentive compatibility thus requires that A() +W () is nonincreasing as well. It follows that
A()  A() +W () is nonincreasing.
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), then we may understand that the expected future payo¤ is reduced due to the possibility of a
future advertising war. Proposition 3 indicates that we may then construct a point-wise equivalent
scheme, (A;W   0) with A()  A()+W (); in which the possibility of a future advertising war
is eliminated (W   0) and current advertising expenditures are increased accordingly (A() 
A() +W ()). A war is redundant in this sense.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 greatly simplify our analysis of the repeated advertising game.
Proposition 3 implies that, for any (A;W ) that solves the Relaxed Program, there exists a point-wise
equivalent no-war scheme, (A;W   0) with A()  A() +W (), that also solves the Relaxed
Program. By Proposition 2, if rms are su¢ ciently patient, we may conclude that an optimal
SPPE exists that is stationary and in which rms use A after all equilibrium-path histories.22.
Proposition 2 also provides a program that may be solved in order to characterize A.
Our next step is to write the static program identied in Proposition 2 in a more useful form.
In particular, using Lemma 1 and W   0, we may integrate by parts and state the program that
A must solve as follows:
No-War Program: The program chooses A to maximize
E [R(; ;A) A()] = R(; ;A) A() + E

D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)

(9)
subject to: A() is nonincreasing in .
Notice that expected prot is characterized in the No-War Program in terms of two components.
Specically, we may understand the RHS of (9) as being comprised of the prot at the top(i.e.,
the current-period prot earned by a rm with cost type ) and the expected information rents.23
Based on our discussion to this point, we may now establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4. (i) Suppose (A;W ) solves the Relaxed Program, and dene A by A() 
A() + W (): Then (A;W   0) solves the Relaxed Program, and so A solves the No-War
Program. (ii) If A solves the No-War Program and (A;W   0) satises (On-IC), then there
exists b 2 (0; 1) such that, for all   b, there exists an optimal SPPE which is stationary, wherein
rms use A after all equilibrium-path histories.
22The arguments developed here may also be applied to the class of SPPE in which advertising entails full sorting
over [; ] in all periods. In particular, an optimal SPPE within the full sorting class is the stationary (no-war) SPPE
in which rms use the advertising equilibrium of the static game in all periods. Thus, for rms to improve on the
advertising equilibrium of the static game, they must use an advertising scheme that entails some pooling.
23 In comparison to the static program identifed in Proposition 2, the No-War Program allows for a larger feasible
set of advertising functions. This is because the No-War Program uses (3) to re-state the objective function but
does not separately use (3) to restrict the feasible set. Accordingly, in some cases, the No-War Program may admit
a solution A() such that (A();W ()  0) does not satisfy (On-IC). In our model of advertising, however, for any
solution to the No-War Program that does not satisfy (On-IC), we can deliver the same prot at the top and that
same market share allocation (and thus the same expected information rents) with another solution A() to the
No-War Program such that (A();W ()  0) does satisfy (On-IC). Hence, one of the solutions to the No-War
Program is a solution to the static program in Proposition 2. In our analysis of solutions to the No-War Program
below, we are careful to focus on solutions that satisfy the on-schedule incentive constraint and thus that also solve
the static program in Proposition 2.
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We note that all of our ndings to this point are quite general, in that they hold for any demand
function D and also for any distribution function F . Further restrictions are required below,
however, in order to characterize the advertising schedule A that solves the No-War Program.
4.2 Optimal SPPE: Pooling at Zero Advertising
In this subsection, we characterize A that solves the No-War Program. We encounter a related
problem in the comparison between the advertising and random equilibria in the static model.
Bagwell and Lee (2009) provide conditions under which expected prot is higher in the random
equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium. Generalizing beyond that particular comparison,
we now show that the same conditions ensure that pooling at zero advertising in fact solves the
No-War Program.
Proposition 5. For  su¢ ciently high, if F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, or
if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then there exists an optimal SPPE that is
stationary, wherein rms pool at zero advertising following all equilibrium-path histories.
Proof. Using part (ii) of Proposition 4, we must show that A  0 solves the No-War Program, if
F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic or if    is su¢ ciently small. Demonstration
of this result is su¢ cient, since (A  0;W   0) clearly satises (On-IC). Let A denote any other
nonincreasing scheme. Note that M(;A) is then nonincreasing, and recall that M(;A)  1N .
Consider rst the prot at the top term in (9). If A entails any sorting, then M(;A) = 1N >
M(;A) and A() = 0  A(). Alternatively, if A is a pooling scheme (at some positive level of
advertising), thenM(;A) = 1N =M(;A) and A
() = 0 < A(). In either case, the prot at the
top is strictly higher under A than under A. Consider second the expected information rents term
in (9). For the special case in which    approaches zero, expected information rents converge to
zero; thus, the prot at the top term dominates if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently
small. For the general case in which the support may be large, we dene the distribution function
G(;A) under A:
G(;A) 
R 
 M(x;A)f(x)dxR 
 M(x;A)f(x)dx
: (10)
The distribution function G(;A) is similarly dened.24 The denominators of G(;A) and G(;A)
represent the (ex ante) expected market share, which equals 1N . Since M(;A
) = 1N crosses
M(;A) from below, G(;A) rst-order stochastically dominates G(;A): G(;A)  G(;A).25
24With our denition of the distribution function and analysis of expected information rents for the general case
in which the support may be large, we build on arguments made by Athey et al (2004) in their analysis of price
collusion.
25 If A is a pooling scheme, then M(;A) crosses M(;A) from below in a weak sense.
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Thus, if D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, thenZ 

D(p())
F
f
()dG (;A) 
Z 

D(p())
F
f
()dG (;A) : (11)
This inequality can be rewritten as
E

D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)

 E

D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)

: (12)
Thus, if D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, then expected information rents are weakly higher under A

than underA. The termD(p())Ff () is nondecreasing when F is log-concave (
F
f () is nondecreasing
in ) and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic.
Proposition 5 establishes conditions under which an optimal SPPE exists, wherein rms pool
at zero advertising in all periods. As indicated in part (ii) of Proposition 4, the key step is to
establish conditions under which the No-War Program is solved with an advertising schedule that
entails pooling at zero advertising.26 Prot at the top is uniquely maximized when rms pool at
zero advertising. The maximization of expected information rents, however, is more subtle. When
D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, expected information rents are higher when market share is taken
from lower types and redistributed to higher types. Since an incentive-compatible market share
allocation function must be nonincreasing, expected information rents are then maximized when the
advertising schedule entails pooling, so that the market share allocation function is constant at 1N .
But whether or not D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing depends on the resolution of conicting forces.
On the one hand, if F is log-concave, then Ff () is increasing in .
27 On the other hand, when
demand is downward sloping, D(p()) is decreasing in . Thus, if F is log-concave and demand
is su¢ ciently inelastic, so that D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing, then pooling at zero advertising
is an optimal SPPE for patient rms.28 Additionally, in the special case in which the support
of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, the No-War Program is solved under pooling at zero
advertising, since then the expected information rents can be made su¢ ciently small that their
sign is immaterial.
We now summarize our ndings. Propositions 2-4 conrm at a general level that equilibrium-
path wars are not necessary for optimality: for any D and F , any optimal SPPE payo¤ can be
achieved by an optimal SPPE that is stationary, wherein rms use A for all equilibrium histories.
We also characterize an optimal SPPE that is stationary. Proposition 5 reports conditions under
which an optimal SPPE that is stationary entails A  0 for all equilibrium histories. Building
on these ndings, we now show that, under the conditions stated in Proposition 5, any optimal
SPPE is stationary and entails A  0 for all equilibrium histories. In this way, we establish the
26This step is su¢ cient, since (On-IC) clearly holds for a pooling, no-war scheme, (A  0;W   0):
27The assumption of log-concavity of F is common in the contract literature and is satised by many distribution
functions.
28We discuss these conicting considerations in greater detail in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009).
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uniqueness of the optimal SPPE presented in Proposition 5.
Proposition 6. For  su¢ ciently high, if F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic,
or if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then any optimal SPPE is stationary,
wherein rms pool at zero advertising following all equilibrium-path histories.
Proof. Fix an SPPE in which rms do not pool at zero following all equilibrium path histories. We
may translate the factorization of this SPPE into a scheme (A;W ) that satises the constraints of
the Relaxed Program. Using Proposition 3, the scheme (A;W ) is point-wise equivalent to a no-war
scheme (A;W   0), where A  A +W . Given the assumed properties of the SPPE, A is not
identically zero. As established in the proof of Proposition 5, if F is log-concave and demand is
su¢ ciently inelastic, or if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then the No-War
Program is uniquely solved when advertising is identically equal to zero. Under these conditions,
therefore, the posited no-war scheme (A;W   0) can be strictly improved upon by an alternative
no-war scheme in which rms do pool at zero advertising. Further, for  su¢ ciently high, we
know from Proposition 4 that the alternative scheme corresponds to an optimal SPPE that exists,
is stationary and entails rms pooling at zero advertising following all equilibrium-path histories.
Thus, under the stated conditions, a stationary SPPE exists with the described properties which
generates a strictly higher expected ex ante prot for rms than does any other SPPE.
While we allow for a wide range of SPPE advertising behaviors in the repeated game, we show
that important conditions exist under which advertising behavior in any optimal SPPE takes a
remarkably simple form: along the equilibrium path, no rm advertises in any period. Intuitively,
the conditions in the proposition favor pooling; and wars are thus redundant in this context, since
the associated payo¤s can be achieved by pooling at a higher level of advertising in the current
period. Furthermore, pooling at a positive level of advertising in the current period is a wasteful
means for rms of achieving the associated market share allocation. They can achieve the same
allocation more protably by pooling at zero advertising.
Propositions 5 and 6 thus provide a formal conrmation of the idea that, even if advertising is
legal and informed consumers are responsive to it, rms may eliminate advertising as part of an
optimal self-enforcing collusive agreement. When rms collude in this way, the welfare of consumers
is reduced from the welfare that they enjoy in the non-cooperative advertising equilibrium. Given
that the induced distribution of monopoly prices is not altered, uninformed consumers surplus
remains una¤ected. The collusive agreement, however, prevents informed consumers from using
advertising to infer the identity of the lowest-cost, and thus the lowest-price, rm in the market.
The average transaction price is thus higher when advertising is eliminated as part of a collusive
agreement among rms.
We emphasize that Propositions 5 and 6 may hold even when demand is elastic. First, observe
that these propositions hold for any demand function, if the support of possible cost types is suf-
ciently small and  is su¢ ciently high. Second, consider the constant-elasticity demand function,
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D(p) = p , and suppose that demand is elastic (i.e.,  > 1). If  is distributed uniformly over [; ]
where  > 0, then D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing when =[   ] > ; thus, any optimal SPPE for
patient rms entails pooling at zero advertising, provided that the elasticity of demand, , does not
exceed a critical level where this level is higher when the support of possible cost types is smaller.
4.3 Optimal SPPE: Partial Pooling
While Proposition 6 isolates an important set of conditions under which any optimal SPPE takes a
very simple form, it is also interesting to consider the form that optimal SPPE may take when these
conditions fail. In this subsection, without requiring thatD(p())Ff () is everywhere nondecreasing,
we establish that optimal SPPE for patient rms involves at least partial pooling.29
A di¢ culty with solving the No-War Program is that the market share function and the as-
sociated expected prot are conditional on the entire advertising schedule. Our analysis therefore
proceeds from the fact that the entire advertising schedule can be decomposed into three di¤erent
kinds of components: sorting, pooling and jumps. Consider the simplest case that has three parts:
from the lowest step (from the highest type), a schedule has a pooling interval with A() = 0
on (y; ] and then jumps to a sorting interval [; y]. This nonincreasing scheme has the following
expected prot:30
E [R(; ;A) A()] = r
 
p(); 

M(;A) +
Z y

D(p())
F
f
()M (;A) dF () (13)
+
Z 
y
D(p())
F
f
()M (;A) dF ():
The market share allocation functions are given by M(;A) = UN + [1   F ()]N 1I for  2 [; y]
and M(;A) = UN + [1   F (y)]N 1 IN for  2 (y; ]. The level of jump is determined such that the
on-schedule constraint is binding at y:
A(y) = r(p(y); y)[1  F (y)]N 1I

1  1
N

: (14)
When y ! , the scheme approaches the fully sorting scheme. Given the assumption that p() > 
and f() > 0, we may di¤erentiate (13) with respect to y and conrm that fully sorting can be
improved upon by a scheme that has at least a small pooling interval at the top, (y; ].
We extend this result and develop two general points. First, any no-war scheme that has a
sorting interval at the top can be improved upon by an alternative no-war scheme that has a
pooling interval at the top (i.e., an interval (y; ] on which A() = 0).31 Second, if rms are
29As above, we solve the No-War Program to characterize optimal SPPE. If the solution to the program involves
positive advertising as in partial pooling, then optimal SPPE may take the form of a stationary or non-stationary
equilibrium; the reason is that rms may then allocate advertising expenses across periods, because of the substi-
tutability between current-period advertising and future advertising wars. If rms implement a non-stationary SPPE,
then they move between cooperative and war phases in their advertising conduct.
30The expression for expected prot is derived in the Appendix.
31The proof for this part is provided by the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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su¢ ciently patient, then any optimal SPPE entails a pooling interval at the top. For the proof of
this second part, assume that an optimal SPPE exists that entails a sorting interval at the top.
We may translate the associated factorization into a scheme (A;W ) that satises the constraints of
the Relaxed Program. From here, we can construct a point-wise equivalent scheme (A;W   0).
Since this no-war scheme also has a sorting interval at the top, it can be improved upon by an
alternative no-war scheme that has a pooling interval at the top. For su¢ ciently patient rms, we
can then support an SPPE in which the advertising schedule from the alternative no-war scheme
is used in each period along the equilibrium path. Our inital assumption is thus contradicted.
Lemma 2. For any F and D, if  is su¢ ciently high, then any optimal SPPE has a pooling
interval (y; ] on which A() = 0.
To present a more comprehensive characterization of optimal SPPE, we next assume that the
entire advertising schedule A is represented by K nite intervals, [[1; 2]; (2; 3]; :::; (K ; K+1]],
where 1 =  and K+1 = , and k < k+1. Referring to Proposition 4 and Lemma 2, we
now restrict attention to stationary (no-war) SPPE which entail pooling at zero advertising on an
interval at the top; straightforward arguments as above ensure that the ndings below hold for
any optimal SPPE for patient rms. If the schedule A solves the No-War Program, then expected
prot is
E [R (; ;A) A ()] = r
 
p(); 

M(;A) (15)
+
KX
k=1
Z k+1
k
D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)dF ():
The market share for  2 (K ; K+1] is M(;A) = UN + [1  F (K)]N 1 IN . If (k; k+1] is a pooling
interval, then, for  2 (k; k+1],
M(;A) =
U
N
+
N 1X
j=0

N   1
j

1
j + 1
[F (k+1)  F (k)]j [1  F (k+1)]N j 1 I: (16)
If (k; k+1] is a sorting interval, then, for  2 (k; k+1], M(;A) = UN + [1  F ()]N 1 I. The
expected market share over the entire interval is 1N :
KX
k=1
Z k+1
k
M(;A)f()d =
1
N
: (17)
An advertising schedule has a discontinuity (a jump) between two pooling intervals and between
sorting and pooling intervals. The level of jump at a point is determined by the binding (On-IC)
at that point.
We next show that optimal SPPE reect forces in favor of pooling in a range of cost types
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where D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing.
32 Suppose that a scheme A is sorting and D(p())Ff () is
nondecreasing in a range (i; i+1]. As we show in detail in the Appendix, we can then construct an
alternative scheme A such that A() preserves the original scheme A() for  > i+1 and A()
is pooling for  2 (i; i+1] and makes a parallel shift from A() for   i.33 Given that A()
replaces sorting with pooling for  2 (i; i+1], the original market shares under A are a¤ected by
A for  2 (i; i+1]. For the a¤ected range (i; i+1], we dene the distribution function under A:
G(i; i+1;A
) 
R 
i
M(x;A)f(x)dxR i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
for  2 (i; i+1]: (18)
The distribution G (i; i+1;A) is analogously dened under A. We conrm in the Appendix that
the denominators of the two distribution functions are the same. Since M(;A) crosses M (;A)
from below in the range (i; i+1], G(i; i+1;A) rst-order stochastically dominates G (i; i+1;A).
We may invoke the argument used in the proof of Proposition 5 and compare the information-rent
terms: Z i+1
i
D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)dF () 
Z i+1
i
D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)dF (): (19)
Since A is designed to preserve the original market share under A other than in the range (i; i+1],
the expected prot remains the same except for the information-rent terms in (19). Hence, we
conclude that the expected prot is weakly higher under A than under A.
This nding can be readily extended. Suppose that D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing for  2
(i; i+1] and is strictly increasing for some interior type  2 (i; i+1). In this case, expected prot
is strictly higher under A than under A, from which it follows that no optimal SPPE is sorting for
 2 (i; i+1].34 Likewise, we may establish that any optimal SPPE involves pooling at the bottom
(i.e., for a range [; x] where x  ). This is because, for any F and D, D(p())Ff () strictly
increases at the neighborhood of ; given f() > 0.
We summarize our ndings as follows:
Proposition 7. Assume that  is su¢ ciently high. (i) For any F and D, any optimal SPPE involves
pooling at the bottom and at the top. (ii) If D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing for  2 (i; i+1] and
is strictly increasing for some interior type in this range, then no optimal SPPE entails sorting for
 2 (i; i+1].
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 7 has two implications. First, since the repeated play
of the advertising equilibrium of the static game is a stationary SPPE that entails full sorting,
Proposition 7 ensures that any optimal SPPE for patient rms involves at least partial pooling and
strictly improves upon the repeated use of the advertising equilibrium. Second, if a sorting interval
32Our analysis refers to two related intervals: (i) the interval of  on which A() is dened and (ii) the interval of
 on which D(p())F
f
() is dened. To avoid confusion, we hereafter refer to the latter interval as the rangeof .
33The denition of A and associated proofs are detailed in the proof of Proposition 7 in the Appendix.
34 In other words, for this case, in an optimal SPPE, it cannot be the true that, for all  2 (i; i+1], A() is strictly
decreasing.
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is ever used by patient rms, then it is restricted to an intermediate rangein which D(p())Ff ()
is nonincreasing.
4.4 Optimal SPPE: At Most Two Pooling Intervals
In Proposition 7 of the previous subsection, we show that optimal SPPE exhibit robust forces in
favor of at least partial pooling. In this subsection, we go further and establish that optimal SPPE
may use quite a small number of pooling steps and restrict the use of sorting interval as a means
of reducing advertising expenses. To develop these points, we now restrict attention to stationary
(no-war) SPPE that entail pooling at the top and at the bottom. We note, though, that our ndings
presented below hold for any optimal SPPE. Our analysis is founded on the following assumption
on F and D.
Assumption 1. D(p())Ff () is strictly quasiconcave with a maximizer 
 2 (; ].
Assumption 1 holds if D(p())Ff () has a unique interior maximizer 
 2 (; ) and is strictly
increasing for  <  and strictly decreasing for  > . It also includes the case where D(p())Ff ()
is everywhere strictly increasing with a maximizer, . Given that D(p()) is strictly decreasing in
, the assumption is satised in a wide range of settings when F is log-concave. For example,
Assumption 1 holds if F is the uniform distribution on [; ] and D(p) = (   p) ; where   0,
(; ; ) > 0 and     > 0. Notice that D(p) is linear when  = 1 and is convex (concave)
when  > 1 ( < 1). Similarly, Assumption 1 holds if F is the uniform distribution on [; ] and
D(p) = p , where  > 0 and  > 1. Using the two demand functions just presented, we can also
numerically conrm that Assumption 1 is satised for a substantially wide range of parameters
when F is a truncated normal distribution.35 Assumption 1 may be violated in cases where
demand is very convex and cost types are distributed with low variance.36
We now show that, under Assumption 1, any optimal SPPE for patient rms entails at most two
pooling intervals. For notational simplicity, let ()  D(p())Ff (). We focus on the case in which
() is strictly quasiconcave with an interior maximizer  2 (; ), relegating related proofs to the
Appendix. We present our ndings in two steps. First, an optimal SPPE cannot have two separate
pooling steps within a range where 0() > 0. If a scheme includes two separate pooling intervals,
(i; y] and (y; i+1], within a range (i; i+1] where 0() > 0, then there is an alternative scheme
that replaces the two pooling steps with one pooling step for  2 (i; i+1]. Using the distributions
for  2 (i; i+1] as in (18), we nd that the expected prot is strictly higher under the alternative
scheme. By the same token, other than the pooling interval at the top, an optimal SPPE cannot
35The normal distribution with mean and variance,  and 2, has density (x)  1p
22
e 
1
2
( x 

)2 where  1 <
x <1. The distribution function is (x) = R x 1 (t)dt. The density under a truncated normal distribution is dened
as f() = ()
() () if     , and f() = 0 otherwise. The associated distribution function is F () =
R 

f(x)dx.
36We have numerically conrmed that the assumption is violated only in a very limited range of parameters, as
in the case where D(p) = (  p) is convex and F is normal with a very low variance (e.g., D(p())F
f
() has two
local maximizers when  = 0;   0:5;  = 1;  = 2;  = 2;  = 0:25 and 2 = 0:01). Note that we set  = 1, to be
consistent with the assumption of unit mass of consumers.
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include a separate pooling interval within a range (i; i+1] where 0() < 0. If a scheme has a
pooling interval (y; z] within (i; i+1] where 0() < 0, then there is an alternative scheme that
replaces pooling with sorting for  2 (y; z]. We also nd that the expected prot is strictly higher
under the alternative scheme.
Second, an optimal SPPE cannot have three pooling steps; equivalently, it cannot have an
intermediate pooling interval.37 Remember that an optimal SPPE cannot include two separate
pooling steps or any sorting interval within [; ] where 0() > 0, and that, other than at the
top, an optimal SPPE cannot have a separate pooling step within (; ] where 0() < 0. Thus,
the one remaining possibility for an optimal SPPE candidate A to have three pooling steps is
that the scheme has pooling steps, [; y], (y; z] and (z; ], such that  < y <  < z < .38
Consider an alternative scheme A that has pooling steps, [; y], (y; z] and (z; ], such that
 <  < y < z < . The alternative scheme lengthens the rst pooling step beyond the range
[; ) where 0() > 0. The original market shares under A are a¤ected by A for  2 [; z]. Given
the a¤ected range [; z], the market shares for types at the bottom [; y] and at the top (y; z] are
lower under A than under A, while the market shares for types in the intermediate range (y; y]
are higher under A than under A. We dene the distribution function under A:
G(; z;A) 
R 
 M(x;A
)f(x)dxR z
 M(x;A
)f(x)dx
for  2 [; z]: (20)
The distribution G(; z;A) is similarly dened under A. The two functions have the same denomi-
nators. Di¤erentiation of the functions with respect to  shows that, given the range [; z], the slope
of G(; z;A) is atter (steeper) than that of G (; z;A) at the bottom [; y] and at the top (y; z]
(in the intermediate range (y; y]). The point y is chosen such that G(; z;A) crosses G(; z;A)
from below at the point .39 Letting ()  G (; z;A) G(; z;A), we then compare the a¤ected
information-rent terms: Z z

()dG(; z;A) 
Z z

()dG (; z;A) (21)
=
Z 

0()()d +
Z z

0()()d > 0:
We thus nd that the expected prot is strictly higher under A than under A. Intuitively, A is
more suitable than A to increase the expected information rents: in the range where 0() > 0,
A decreases the market share for types below y 2 (; ) and increases the market share for types
above y; and in the range where 0() < 0, A increases the market share for types below y 2 (; z)
37From the analysis below, it follows that an optimal SPPE cannot have more than three pooling steps.
38The scheme A may include a sorting interval between (y; z] and (z; ] where 0() < 0. The ndings below are
not a¤ected by this change.
39Observe that y 2 (; z). If y  , then G(; z;A) crosses G (; z;A) at type  < , since the slope of
G(; z;A) is atter than that of G (; z;A) in the range (y; z]. If y = z, then G(; z;A) crosses G (; z;A) from
below at the endpoint z > .
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and decreases the market share for types above y. Observe further that, other than the pooling at
the top (z; ], A includes a separate pooling step (y; z] within the range (; ] where 0() < 0.
We can then construct another alternative scheme that replaces pooling with sorting for  2 (y; z]
and strictly improves upon the scheme A. Hence, an optimal SPPE cannot have an intermediate
pooling interval.
We now summarize our ndings:
Proposition 8. Suppose that  is su¢ ciently high and that Assumption 1 is satised. (i) An
optimal SPPE has at most two pooling intervals: it is characterized by either (a) one full pooling
step at zero advertising or (b) two pooling steps with or without an intermediate sorting interval.
(ii) If an optimal SPPE ever includes an intermediate sorting interval, then it restricts the sorting
interval to a subset of the range in which D(p())Ff () is strictly decreasing.
The proof is in the Appendix. For  su¢ ciently high, Proposition 8 complements the nding that
an optimal SPPE must entail pooling at the bottom and at the top. Under Assumption 1, if an
optimal SPPE ever involves sorting, it uses sorting only once in an intermediate range of cost
types; hence, the possible forms of optimal SPPE are characterized by the two cases specied in
Proposition 8 (i). Whether an optimal SPPE includes a sorting scheme depends on the extent
to which D(p())Ff () decreases in an intermediate range and the magnitude of the prot at the
top.40 Proposition 8 thus conrms the idea that, under general demand functions, patient rms
may use a small number of pooling steps and restrict the use of sorting intervals as a means of
reducing the intensity of advertising competition.41 To the detriment of consumer welfare, such a
collusive agreement restricts the informed consumerscapacity to locate the lowest available price
in the market.
5 O¤-Schedule Incentive Constraints
Up to this point, we have ignored o¤-schedule incentive constraints by assuming that rms are
su¢ ciently patient. We now consider o¤-schedule constraints and characterize the critical discount
factor above which they are satised. In particular, motivated by our ndings above, we charac-
terize the critical discount factor for optimal SPPE that are stationary and entail pooling at zero
advertising or entail two pooling intervals with an intermediate sorting interval.
We rst characterize the critical discount factor, bp 2 (0; 1), above which an optimal SPPE
exists that is stationary and entails pooling at zero advertising (as established in Proposition 5).
When rms pool at zero advertising, a rm faces a temptation to cheat by advertising a small,
40Suppose that D(p) = 1   p; N = 5 and F is the uniform distribution on [0; ]: Then, D(p())F
f
() = (1 )
2
is concave with a maximizer 0:5. If  = 0:99, then any optimal SPPE has two pooling steps with an intermediate
sorting interval approximately on (0:752; 0:962]. If  = 0:77, then any optimal SPPE has only two pooling steps with
a jump at 0:75. If  = 0:70, then it has a single pooling step at zero advertising.
41We can also show that Proposition 8 holds even in settings where Assumption 1 may fail. In particular, Proposition
8 holds as well if D(p())F
f
() is strictly quasiconcave for    2 (; ) with a local maximizer  and is strictly
quasiconvex for  >  with a local minimizer  > .
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positive amount, as it thereby attracts all informed consumers rather than only its share of these
consumers. This short-term incentive to cheat must be balanced against the long-term cost of a
punishment (i.e., a reduced continuation value). Given our focus on SPPE, such a punishment must
be experienced by all rms. We thus suppose that an o¤-schedule deviation of this kind triggers
a reversion to the advertising equilibrium of the static game.42 Thus, the long-term cost of an
o¤-schedule deviation is that the future discounted expected prot associated with pooling at zero
advertising is replaced with that associated with the repeated play of the advertising equilibrium.
In other words, if a rm cheats on the collusive agreement to not advertise, then a breakdown in
cooperation occurs and the rms revert to the advertising equilibrium thereafter.
We now consider the type of rm for which the o¤-schedule constraint rst binds. Given our
assumption that cost types are determined in an iid fashion through time, a rm faces the same
long-term cost of an o¤-schedule deviation regardless of its current type, . The short-term incentive
to deviate, however, is sensitive to . In particular, when rms pool at zero advertising, a rm
with cost type  has the greatest short-term incentive to defect. This type of rm values most the
increase in market share that accompanies cheating, since it has the highest prot-if-win, r(p(); ).
When rms pool at zero advertising, the o¤-schedule constraint is sure to hold for all  if it holds
for . We may thus represent the o¤-schedule constraint for this situation as follows:
r(p(); )I

1  1
N

 
1   (
p   s) ; (22)
where s  E [(; ;A)] and p  E

r(p(); ) 1N

are a rms expected per-period prot when
rms separate using the advertising equilibrium, A, and pool at zero advertising, respectively. The
expected per-period prot under the advertising equilibrium is directly characterized by (9) in the
No-War Program:
E [(; ;A)] = r(p(); )
U
N
+ E

D(p())
F
f
()M(;A)

(23)
where M(;A) = UN + [1  F ()]N 1I and we use that A() = 0.
Solving (22) for the critical discount factor, we obtain that pooling at zero advertising satises
the o¤-schedule constraint if
  bp  r(p(); )(N   1)I
r(p(); )(N   1)I +N (p   s) : (28)
As shown in Proposition 6, p > s if F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, or if
    is su¢ ciently small. Thus, under these conditions, bp 2 (0; 1). We have thus established:
Proposition 9. If F is log-concave and demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, or if the support of
42Other symmetric punishments, such as those that take a carrot-stick form, may also be considered. Building
on arguments developed by Athey et al. (2004), we can show that the repeated play of the advertising equilibrium
generates the lowest SPPE payo¤ when D(p())F
f
() is everywhere nondecreasing.
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possible cost types is su¢ ciently small, then, for all   bp, there exists an optimal SPPE, and in
any optimal SPPE rms pool at zero advertising following all equilibrium-path histories.
In comparison to Proposition 6, Proposition 9 provides an explicit characterization of the critical
discount factor above which rms can enforce the unique optimal SPPE outcome, wherein no rm
advertises in any period.
We next characterize the critical discount factor, b2p 2 (0; 1), above which an optimal SPPE
exists that is stationary and entails two pooling intervals. Suppose that a scheme A solves the
No-War Program and has two pooling steps, [; y] and (z; ], and an intermediate sorting interval
(y; z].43 The scheme has jumps at y and at z. Any o¤-schedule deviation, ba, takes the form of either
(i) ba > A() for  2 [; y] or (ii) ba < A() for  2 [; y]. The rst deviation is to out-advertise
rms on the interval [; y], and the second deviation is to out-advertise rms on the interval (y; z]
or [z; ]. We now consider the o¤-schedule incentive constraints that are associated with these two
deviations.
We begin with the rst deviation. This deviation captures all informed consumers. We show
that a rm with type  has the greatest short-term gain from the rst deviation. Consider rst
the corresponding o¤-schedule constraint for  2 [; y]. Among the types on [; y], a rm with cost
type  has the greatest short-term gain from the deviation. We may represent the o¤-schedule
constraint for  as
r(p(); )

U
N
+ I  M(;A)

 
1  
 
2p   s ; (25)
where 2p  E [(; ;A)] is a rms expected per-period prot under the two-step scheme A
described above. The LHS represents the short-term gain for . Consider next the o¤-schedule
constraint for  > y. The short-term gain for  2 (y; ] is
r(p(); )

U
N
+ I  M(;A)

  [A() A()] (26)
= r(p(); )

U
N
+ I  M(;A)

  [(; ;A) (; ;A)];
where the equality utilizes (; ;A) = r(p(); )M(;A)   A(). Note that (; ;A) 
(; ;A) is ensured by (On-IC). It then follows that the short-term gain for  in (25) is greater
than for  2 (y; ] in (26).
For the rst deviation, we may thus solve (25) for the critical discount factor. We nd that the
rst deviation is unattractive to a rm with type ; and thus to a rm with any type , if
  b;y  r(p(); )(1  (y))I
r(p(); )(1  (y))I + (2p   s) : (27)
43Our analysis can be readily modied to characterize the critical discount factor when the scheme has only two
pooling intervals (y = z).
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Since [; y] is a pooling interval, (y) in (27) is dened by
(y) 
N 1X
j=0

N   1
j

1
j + 1
[F (y)]j [1  F (y)]N j 1 : (28)
Given our assumption that A has two pooling regions and solves the No-War Program, we have
that (y) 2 (0; 1) and 2p > s, from which it follows that b;y 2 (0; 1).
We next explore the second deviation. We show that a rm with type z has the greatest short-
term gain from the second deviation. Consider rst a deviation with ba that is slightly above the
on-schedule advertising A+(y), where A+(y)  lim sup>y A() represents the limit from the right.
Under this deviation, a rm out-advertises rms on the sorting interval (y; z] and thus obtains the
market share UN + [1 F (y)]N 1I. Note that any rm with type  can earn the same market share
when it chooses the on-schedule advertising A+(y). Hence, as long as (On-IC) holds for , then
the rm with type  will not undertake such an o¤-schedule deviation. Consider next a deviation
with ba that is slightly above zero. With this deviation, a rm out-advertises rms on (z; ] and
thus obtains the market share UN + [1   F (z)]N 1I. Note that any rm with type  can earn the
same market share when it chooses the on-schedule advertising A(z). Thus, the short-term gain
from the second deviation for type  becomes
r(p(); ) [M(z;A) M(;A)] +A() (29)
= (z; ;A) (; ;A) +A(z)  A(z);
where the inequality follows since (On-IC) ensures that (; ;A)  (z; ;A). The RHS of the
inequality, A(z), represents the short-term gain when  = z. Thus, a rm with type z gains the
most from out-advertising rms on (z; ]. Observe that a rm with type zs short-term gain, A(z),
is the level of the jump made at z such that (On-IC) is binding:
A(z) = r(p(z); z)[1  F (z)]N 1I

1  1
N

: (30)
We may thus represent the o¤-schedule constraint for type z as
r(p(z); z)[1  F (z)]N 1I

1  1
N

 
1  
 
2p   s : (31)
For the second deviation, we may thus solve (31) for the critical discount factor. We nd that
the second deviation is unattractive to a rm with type z, and thus to a rm with any type , if
  bz;  r(p(z); z)(N   1)[1  F (z)]N 1Ir(p(z); z)(N   1)[1  F (z)]N 1I +N (2p   s) : (32)
Arguing as above, we can establish that bz; 2 (0; 1).
We are now ready to summarize our ndings concerning o¤-schedule constraints and the posited
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optimal SPPE with two pooling intervals. In particular, the no-war scheme A satises all o¤-
schedule constraints if (27) and (32) are satised; thus, this scheme satises all o¤-schedule con-
straints if   b2p  maxfb;y;bz;g, where the critical discount factor, b2p, satises b2p 2 (0; 1).
Thus far, we have characterized critical discount factors within the class of stationary (no-
war) SPPE. As we show in previous sections, for su¢ ciently patient rms, the use of a stationary
(no-war) scheme does not limit the scope of optimal SPPE: the payo¤s achieved in any optimal
non-stationary SPPE can always be achieved as well in an optimal SPPE that is stationary. In fact,
this same result holds as well when rms are less patient and o¤-schedule constraints may bind.
Intuitively, if an o¤-schedule constraints is an issue, it is better to shift current-period prot toward
the future, as a rm then has more to lose in the future by undertaking an o¤-schedule deviation
in the present. Exploiting the substitutability between current advertising and future wars, rms
can achieve the desired shift by increasing advertising and eliminating future wars. Athey, et al
(2004) provide a related argument in their analysis of price collusion among impatient rms, and
so we do not develop this point in further detail here.
6 Conclusion
We investigate the advertising behavior of rms with private information as to their respective costs.
We begin by considering a static advertising game in which each rms advertising choice may signal
its costs, and thus its price, to those consumers who are informed of advertising activities. In the
static game, an advertising equilibrium exists, in which informed consumers use an advertising
search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising rm. In this equilibrium, non-price
advertising directs consumers to the rm with the lowest cost and price in the market.44 We next
analyze a repeated advertising game in which privately informed rms may achieve a self-enforcing
agreement to limit the use of advertising. We observe that rms face trade-o¤s when selecting
an optimal collusive scheme: while the use of advertising can direct sales to lower-cost rms and
thereby promote productive e¢ ciency, it can do so only when su¢ cient current or future advertising
expenses are incurred. If rms sacrice productive e¢ ciency by pooling at zero advertising, they can
eliminate current and future advertising expenses. Allowing for a wide range of collusive advertising
behaviors, we establish conditions under which optimal collusion entails pooling at zero advertising.
We also show that, under general conditions, optimal collusion involves at least partial pooling and
thus strictly improves upon the repeated use of the static advertising equilibrium. In summary,
non-price advertising can promote product e¢ ciency and raise consumer welfare; however, colluding
rms often have incentive to limit the use of non-price advertising.
We close by mentioning two possible extensions of the model. A rst possibility is that ad-
vertising by any one rm may have a public-good aspect and serve to expand the size of market
demand. By contrast, in the model analyzed above, advertising is redistributive: the size of aggre-
gate demand is not a¤ected by advertising, and so one rms market-share gain is another rms
44The static advertising game is analyzed in greater detail in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2009).
30
market-share loss. In the case of public-good advertising, when a rm advertises more, aggre-
gate demand increases and so rival rms benet to some degree as well. In this setting, colluding
rms may have incentive to share advertising expenses. For new-product markets in particular, an
analysis of such collusive advertising is an important direction for future work.
A second possibility is to extend our analysis to allow for asymmetric equilibria. In their price-
collusion model, Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that prot may be higher in asymmetric perfect
public equilibria than in SPPE. They emphasize the role of future market share favors, whereby a
rm that claims low costs and enjoys high market share today su¤ers a reduced market share in
the future. Rival rms then enjoy a future market share gain. In this way, asymmetric equilibria
allow that continuation values may be used to satisfy on-schedule constraints, without requiring
that rms symmetrically experience a reduced continuation value.45 In their model, consumers
observe prices and have no independent interest in rmscosts. By contrast, in our advertising
model, informed consumers observe advertising and draw inferences as to costs and thus prices.
The construction of asymmetric equilibria may be more challenging in this context. Suppose that
one rm advertises heavily in the current period and that the equilibrium then requires that this
rm advertise less in the future, so as to transfer future market share to other rms. If informed
consumers understand the equilibrium, then they recognize that the reduced level of advertising by
this rm in some future period is not necessarily a signal that this rm has a high cost and thus a
high price in that period. Thus, even if the equilibrium calls for reduced advertising by this rm,
this in itself does not guarantee that the rm obtains reduced market share.
7 Appendix
This appendix has three parts. The rst part extends our analysis so as to consider the robustness
of the results of the repeated game to a relaxation under which past price selections are publicly
observed by all rms. The second part derives the expected prot in (13). The third part provides
proofs.
7.1 Public Price Histories
In our repeated-game analysis, we assume that each rm observes the realization of rival rms
past advertising choices but not the realization of rival rmspast pricing choices. This assumption
may be appropriate in retail markets with complex and customer-specic pricing schemes, or when
search costs are high. It also enables us to set prices at monopoly levels, so that we may focus
on the incentive constraints that are associated with collusion in advertising. This assumption is
not always plausible, however, and we now briey discuss the robustness of our analysis when this
assumption is relaxed.
45As Athey and Bagwell (2008) show in their analysis of price collusion, however, when cost shocks are persistent,
the advantage of asymmetric equilibria may be signicantly reduced. Indeed, if demand is perfectly inelastic and the
distribution of types is log-concave, they show that a stationary pooling equilibrium is optimal for patient rms when
cost types are perfectly persistent. Lee (2009) shows that the potential disadvantage of SPPE may diminish when
colluding rms use a contractual device to restrict their incentives to distort private information for their own gain.
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In our extended model, each rm observes the realizations of rival rmspast advertising and
price choices. A rm with cost type  can then undertake an on-schedule deviation only if it mimics
the advertising and price selection of a rm with cost type b. The gain from mimicry then can
be reduced, and new equilibria exist. At the same time, the equilibria that we characterize above
- in which rms set their monopoly prices - continue to exist when price histories are public. In
the extended model, if rms simply condition their future play on the public history of advertising,
then rms again set their monopoly prices.
Formally, in the repeated game with public price histories, we denote a candidate advertising
and pricing schedule as (A; ), where () may di¤er from the monopoly price p(). If a rm of
cost type  mimics the advertising and price selection of a rm of cost type b, then it must select
A(b) and (b). To use the Relaxed Program, we let W (b)  [supV  v(A(b); (b);A; )] and write
the interim-stage prot as
(b; ;A; )  r((b); )M(b;A) A(b) W (b):
For simplicity, we assume that A and  are continuously di¤erentiable except at a nite number of
points where the functions may jump.
The scheme (A; ;W ) satises on-schedule incentive compatibility only if two conditions hold.
First, a local optimality condition must hold. Under an appropriate envelope theorem (Milgrom
and Segal, 2002), we may use 2(b; ;A; ) =  D((b))M(b;A) to get
(; ;A; ) = r((); )M(;A) A() W () +
Z 

D((x))M(x;A)dx:
Second, a monotonicity condition must hold: D(())M(;A) must be nonincreasing in . This is
established by adding two on-schedule incentive constraints:
r((); )M(;A) A() W ()  r((b); )M(b;A) A(b) W (b)
r((b);b)M(b;A) A(b) W (b)  r(();b)M(;A) A() W ():
As in Lemma 1, these two necessary conditions are also su¢ cient for (A; ;W ) to satisfy on-schedule
incentive compatibility.
We now restrict attention to those incentive-compatible schemes (A; ;W ) for which informed
consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule. Given this restriction, we nd that
A() must be nonincreasing and () must be nondecreasing; thus, (A; ;W ) satises on-schedule
incentive compatibility and is also consistent with the rational use of the advertising search rule
only if M(;A) and D(()) are each nonincreasing.46 Consider next the potential use of wars.
When past prices are public, we cannot immediately use the arguments in Proposition 3 to establish
that wars are unnecessary. The reason is that incentive compatibility no longer ensures that A()+
W () is nonincreasing; hence, we cannot be sure that an alternative scheme dened by A() 
46Assume to the contrary that  > b and A() > A(b). Given the restriction that informed consumers ra-
tionally use the advertising search rule, this assumption implies M(;A) > M(b;A) and ()  (b) (i.e.,
D(())  D((b))). Thus, A() > A(b) implies D(())M(;A) > D((b))M(b;A), which contradicts the re-
quirement that D(())M(;A) is nonincreasing. Hence, A() must be nonincreasing. Under the restriction that
informed consumers rationally use the advertising search rule, if A() is nonincreasing, then M(;A) is nonincreasing
and () is nondecreasing (i.e., D(()) is nonincreasing).
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A()+W () would exhibit the necessary nonincreasing property.47 We can establish that wars are
unnecessary in the limiting case where demand is perfectly inelastic; however, the arguments used
for this limiting case cannot be directly applied when demand is downward sloping.48
We now argue that robust forces in favor of at least partial pooling in advertising are present in
the extended model. We develop our argument in three steps. First, we consider the limiting case
in which demand is perfectly inelastic and assume that the reservation value r satises r > . As
just noted, in this case, wars are unnecessary, and so we focus on stationary SPPE (i.e., schemes
(A; ;W ) in which W  0). Let us now x any candidate nondecreasing pricing schedule ()
satisfying () > .49 In the case of perfectly inelastic demand, our monotonicity requirement
reduces to the requirement that M(;A) is nonincreasing. Arguing as in the proof of Proposition
5, if F is log-concave, we may establish that expected prot is then maximized by the advertising
schedule in which A()  0, so thatM(;A)  1N . With A()  0 W (), there is no potential gain
to rms from distorting prices; thus, the optimal nondecreasing pricing schedule entails monopoly
pricing with ()  r. Thus, for the limiting case in which demand is perfectly inelastic, whether
or not rivalspast prices are publicly observed, we can construct an optimal SPPE for patient rms
in which rms pool at zero advertising in each period.
Second, returning to our assumption of downward-sloping demand, let us consider any incentive-
compatible scheme (A; ;W ) for which D(()) and M(;A) are nonincreasing, and let us further
restrict consideration to pricing functions for which D(())Ff () is nondecreasing and ()  .
Expected prot for incentive-compatible schemes can be represented as
E [(; ;A; )] = r((); )M(;A) A() W () + E

D(())
F
f
()M(;A)

:
If we maximize this expression over the incentive-compatible schemes under consideration, then we
may argue as in the proof of Proposition 5 that expected prot is maximized when M(;A)  1N
and thus A  0. In a case of special interest, the restriction that D(())Ff () is nondecreasing
is satised if F is log-concave and all types of rms set a constant price,   ()  . Firms
47Consider a two-step scheme in which A is at a high (low) level for cost types below (at or above) a critical type,
c. Suppose that () = p(c) for types at or above c while () = p() for types below c. Even though market
share is higher for lower types, a rm with type c may earn greater net revenue by setting its monopoly price and
accepting a lower market share. On-schedule incentive compatibility would then require that A() +W () is higher
for higher types.
48Suppose that demand is perfectly inelastic and consider a two-step scheme. The two steps are separated by a
critical type, c, and we let b represent a type on the bottom step and t represent a type on the top step (i.e.,
b < c < t). Suppose that A(b) > A(t) and thus M(b;A) > M(t;A). Suppose further that A +W increases
across the steps: A(t)+W (t) > A(b)+W (b). Incentive compatibility is satised if type c is indi¤erent between
the two steps. Given that the top step entails a lower value for M and a higher value for A +W , this is possible
only if the top step entails a higher price: (t) > (b). We now create a new scheme, in which W (t) is lowered
to a new value, WN (t), at which A(b) +W (b) = A(t) +WN (t) + ", for " > 0 small. To maintain incentive
compatibility, we adjust (t) downward until type c is again indi¤erent. The resulting new price, N (t), satises
N (t) > (b). This maneuver maintains prot for all types. We next eliminate wars and dene A
 in terms of the
new scheme: A(b) = A(b)+W (b) and A(t) = A(t)+WN (t). Note that A decreases with  as we move from
the bottom step to the top step, just as did A; hence, A generates the same market share allocation as did A. We
have thus generated a point-wise equivalent no-war scheme. Finally, we note that, if demand were instead downward
sloping, then such step-by-step maneuvers would not generate a point-wise equivalent no-war scheme. This is because
the appeal of a price change then varies with cost type. For related reasons, Athey et al. (2004) are also unable to
eliminate wars when demand is downward sloping.
49 If ()   for a nondecreasing price schedule, we could raise () above  and adjust all prices for lower types
upward so as to maintain incentive compatibility. This maneuver would raise expected prot, and so we may restrict
attention to candidate pricing schedules satisfying () > .
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may set a constant price for a variety of (unmodeled) reasons, including resale price maintenance
requirements and customer market concerns. In fact, when these reasons apply and a constant price
is used, we can argue as in Proposition 3 and show that, if F is log-concave, then optimal SPPE
for patient rms entails A  0 and W   0. Of course, in the case where price is exogenously
xed at p, it is immaterial whether or not price is public.
Third, robust forces remain in favor of at least partial pooling in advertising even for general
demand functions.50 We make this point in a simple way. Consider any scheme (A; ;W ) in which
A entails full sorting over [; ]. We construct an alternative scheme (A  0; ;W   0), where
 is constant and satises
Z 

D()
1
N
dF (x) =
Z 

D((x))[
U
N
+ [1  F (x)]N 1I]dF (x):
We then dene a distribution function under A  0 and :
G (;A; ) 
R 
 D(
) 1N f(x)dxR 
 D(
) 1N f(x)dx
:
A distribution G (;A; ) is analogously dened under A and . Given that G(;A; ) rst-order
stochastically dominates G (;A; ), if F is log-concave, then the alternative scheme generates
higher expected information rents than does the original scheme:
Z 

F
f
()D()
1
N
dF () 
Z 

F
f
()D(())[
U
N
+ [1  F (x)]N 1I]dF ():
If  >  and I is su¢ ciently large such that r(; ) 1N  r((); )UN , then the alternative scheme
does not cause any reduction in the prot at the top. As we argue above, however, as a general
matter, we cannot directly conclude that wars are unnecessary under general demand functions.
7.2 Derivation of Expected Prot
We show that, if A has a pooling interval with A() = 0 on (y; ] and jumps to a sorting interval
on [; y]; then it has the expected prot (13) in the text. The interim-stage prot for   y is
R(; ;A) A() = R(y; y;A) A(y) +
Z y

D(p(x))M(x;A)dx; (A1)
while the interim-stage prot at y is
R(y; y;A) A(y) = R(; ;A) A() +
Z 
y
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx: (A2)
50Our discussion here builds on Athey et al. (2004).
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Using (A1) and (A2), we nd the interim-stage prot for   y:
R(; ;A) A() = R(; ;A) A() +
Z y

D(p(x))M(x;A)dx (A3)
+
Z 
y
D(p(x))M(x;A)dx:
The interim-stage prot for  > y is
R(; ;A) A() = R(; ;A) A() +
Z 

D(p(x))M(x;A)dx: (A4)
Based on the two interim-stage prots, (A3) and (A4), we nd the expected prot (13) by inte-
grating by parts and setting A() = 0.
7.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove that any optimal no-war scheme (A;W  0) has pooling at the top
interval (y; ] where A() = 0. Suppose that a scheme has a sorting interval at the top on (y; ].
Then we can consider an alternative scheme A that decomposes the sorting interval (y; ] into a
sorting interval (y; y] and a pooling interval (y; ] where y > y. The expected prot under A
becomes
E[(; ;A
)] = r(p(); )

U
N
+ [1  F (y)]N 1 I
N

+
Z y

D(p())F ()M(;A)d
+
Z y
y
D(p())F ()

U
N
+ [1  F ()]N 1I

d
+
Z 
y
D(p())F ()

U
N
+ [1  F (y)]N 1 I
N

d:
Note that, if y ! , then this scheme A approaches the initial scheme. We show that the optimal
choice of y is lower than . The derivative of expected prot with respect to y is given by
[1  F (y)]N 1 (N   1)I
N

D(p(y))F (y)  r(p(); ) f(y
)
1  F (y)

 (N   1)I
N
Z 
y
D(p())F ()[1  F (y)]N 2f(y)d:
Since f() > 0 and p() > , expected prot rises when y slightly falls from . 
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume that a no-war scheme A entails sorting for  2 (i; i+1] such
that 
 : A0() < 0
	 \ n : D(p())Ff () is nondecreasingo = (i; i+1]:
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This interval (i; i+1] cannot be the interval at the top, given that we restrict attention to the no-
war scheme that has pooling at zero advertising on an interval at the top. We dene an alternative
no-war scheme A as:
A() =
8>>>><>>>>:
A() if  > i+1
Ap  A+(i+1) + r(p(i+1); i+1) [M(;A) M+(i+1;A)] if  2 (i; i+1]
A(i)  Ap + r(p(i); i) [M(;A) M+(i;A)] if  = i
A()  [A(i) A(i)] if  < i:
The notations A+() and M+(;A) represent the associated limit from the right. The alternative
scheme jumps at i and i+1 such that (On-IC) is binding at each point. It preserves A above i+1,
pools over (i; i+1] and makes a parallel shift from A by A(i) A(i) below i. In our notation,
M(;A) for  2 (i; i+1] equals M+(i;A).
We rst prove that, if ()  D(p())Ff () is nondecreasing for  2 (i; i+1], then expected
prot is weakly higher under A than under A. We dene the distribution function under A:
G(i; i+1;A
) 
R 
i
M(x;A)f(x)dxR i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
for  2 (i; i+1];
where M(x;A) represents the market share allocated to x 2 (i; i+1] under pooling:
M(x;A) =
U
N
+
N 1X
j=0

N   1
j

1
j + 1
[F (i+1)  F (i)]j [1  F (i+1)]N j 1 I: (A5)
The distribution G (i; i+1;A) is analogously dened under A whereM(x;A) = UN+[1 F (x)]N 1I.
We next show that G(i; i+1;A) rst-order stochastically dominates G(i; i+1;A).
To this end, we begin by showing that the two distribution functions have the same denomina-
tors:
8i+1  i;
Z i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx =
Z i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx: (A6)
The equality is immediate if i+1 = i. For any i+1 > i, we claim that
@
R i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
@i+1
=
@
R i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
@i+1
: (A7)
In other words, the expected market shares (denominators) are the same in both schemes at i+1 =
i, and we claim that they then increase at the same rate as i+1 rises above i. Given that A is
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pooling on (i; i+1], the LHS of (A7) is
@
R i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
@i+1
=

U
N
+ [1  F (i+1)]N 1I

f(i+1)
=
@
R i+1
i

U
N + [1  F (x)]N 1I

f(x)dx
@i+1
=
@
R i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
@i+1
:
Using (A5), the rst equality is established by a tedious work of induction for N  2. The last
term is the RHS of (A7). Our claim that (A7) holds is now established. Hence, the denominators
of the two distributions are the same. Further, using M(x;A) = UN +[1 F (x)]N 1I, we can deriveZ i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx =
Z i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx (A8)
=

[1  F (i)]N   [1  F (i+1)]N
 I
N
+ [F (i+1)  F (i)]U
N
;
so that we now have an explicit expression for the common value taken by the denominators of the
two distributions.
We next di¤erentiate the two distribution functions with respect to . Since the denominators
are the same and do not change with  as seen in (A8), we nd
@
@
[G (i; i+1;A) G(i; i+1;A)] = [M(;A) M(;A
)] f()R i+1
i
M(x;A)f(x)dx
;
where M(;A) = UN + [1  F ()]N 1 I and M(;A) is given by (A5). Given the range (i; i+1],
M(;A) crosses M(;A) from below. It then follows that G(i; i+1;A) rst-order stochastically
dominates G(i; i+1;A). In other words, G (i; i+1;A) > G(i; i+1;A) for  2 (i; i+1) and
G (i; i+1;A) = G(i; i+1;A
) for  2 fi; i+1g.
We next compare the expected prots under the two schemes. Suppose that A is represented by
K subintervals; note that the original scheme A may be represented by less than K subintervals if A
involves sorting consecutively over its neighboring interval, (i 1; i] or (i+1; i+2]. The expected
prot under A is
E [(; ;A
)] = r(p(); )M(;A) (A9)
+
KX
k 6=i;k=1
Z k+1
k
()M(;A)f()d
+
Z i+1
i
()M(;A)f()d:
Since A is designed to preserve the original market shares under A except for  2 (i; i+1]
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(as proven below), the expected prot under A is the same as the RHS of (A9) except for the
last information-rent term. To compare the associated information-rent terms, we evaluate the
di¤erential: Z i+1
i
()dG(i; i+1;A
) 
Z i+1
i
()dG (i; i+1;A)
=
Z i+1
i
0() [G (i; i+1;A) G(i; i+1;A)] d:
If 0()  0 for  2 (i; i+1], thenZ i+1
i
()dG(i; i+1;A
) 
Z i+1
i
()dG (i; i+1;A) :
The inequality can be rewritten asZ i+1
i
()M(;A)f()d 
Z i+1
i
()M(;A)f()d:
Thus, if 0()  0 for  2 (i; i+1], then A makes a weakly higher expected prot than A.
Further, if 0()  0 for  2 (i; i+1] and 0() > 0 for some  2 (i; i+1), then A makes a strictly
higher expected prot than A; in this case, an optimal no-war scheme cannot entail sorting for
 2 (i; i+1].
We next show that A preserves the original market shares under A except for  2 (i; i+1].
Consider two cases. Suppose rst that the original scheme is sorting consecutively over its neigh-
boring interval, (i 1; i] or (i+1; i+2], so that A is sorting for  2 (i 1; i+1] or for  2 (i; i+2].
Then, pooling on (i; i+1] does not a¤ect the (expected) market share for types on the neighboring
sorting interval; in particular, for any sorting interval, the market share for  is UN +[1  F ()]N 1 I.
Suppose second that the original scheme is sorting for  2 (i; i+1] and is adjacent to a pooling
interval. If A is pooling for  2 (i 1; i] or for  2 (i+1; i+2]; then it has a jump at i or at i+1.
If A is pooling on (i 1; i], then the market share for  2 (i 1; i] is the same under A and under
A:
U
N
+
N 1X
j=0

N   1
j

1
j + 1
[F (i)  F (i 1)]j [1  F (i)]N j 1 I:
Likewise, if A is pooling on (i+1; i+2], then the market share for  2 (i+1; i+2] is the same under
both schemes. If the original market shares for the neighboring intervals are not a¤ected by A,
then the market shares for the remaining types will not be a¤ected by A.
We nally show that our result holds for any optimal SPPE. Assume that an optimal SPPE
exists in which the associated advertising schedule entails sorting for  2 (i; i+1] when 0()  0 for
 2 (i; i+1] and 0() > 0 for some  2 (i; i+1). We may translate the factorization of this SPPE
into a scheme (A;W ) that satises the constraints of the Relaxed Program. This scheme in turn is
point-wise equivalent to a no-war scheme (A;W   0), where A is sorting for  2 (i; i+1]. As
argued above, this no-war scheme can be strictly improved upon by an alternative no-war scheme
that is pooling for  2 (i; i+1]. If rms are su¢ ciently patient, we can construct an SPPE in
which the advertising schedule from this alternative no-war scheme is used in every period along
the equilibrium path. This contradicts our initial assumption.
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Proof of Proposition 8. We show that an optimal SPPE has at most two pooling steps when
()  D(p())Ff () is strictly quasiconcave with a maximizer  2 (; ]. When  = , the proof
is immediate from Proposition 6. Hence, we consider the case in which  <  < . We establish
the nding in three steps.
Step 1: We establish two ndings. First, an optimal SPPE cannot have two separate pooling
steps within [; ] where 0() > 0. Suppose that an optimal scheme A has two separate pooling
intervals, [; y] and (y; z], within [; ] such that  < y < z  . We construct an alternative
scheme A that replaces the two pooling steps with one pooling step for  2 [; z]. The original
market shares under A are a¤ected by A for  2 [; z]. Given the a¤ected range [; z], dene the
distribution function under A:
G (; z;A) 
R 
 M(x;A)f(x)dxR y
 M(x;A)f(x)dx+
R z
y M(x;A)f(x)dx
for  2 [; z]: (A10)
The distribution function under A is
G(; z;A) 
R 
 M(x;A
)f(x)dxR z
 M(x;A
)f(x)dx
for  2 [; z]: (A11)
The denominators of distributions are the same. Using (A8), the denominator of (A10) is

[1  F ()]N   [1  F (y)]N I
N
+ [F (y)  F ()]U
N
+

[1  F (y)]N   [1  F (z)]N I
N
+ [F (z)  F (y)]U
N
=

[1  F ()]N   [1  F (z)]N I
N
+ [F (z)  F ()]U
N
:
The RHS is the denominator of (A11). In the range [; z], M(;A) crosses M(;A) from below
and thus G(; z;A) rst-order stochastically dominates G(; z;A): G(; z;A) > G(; z;A) for
 2 (; z) and G(; z;A) = G(; z;A) for  2 f; zg. It then follows that the expected prot is
strictly higher under A than under A. This contradict the optimality of A. This non-optimality
of the original scheme can be readily extended to any other scheme that has multiple pooling steps
or includes some sorting interval within [; z].
Second, given 0() < 0 for  2 (; ], an optimal scheme cannot include a separate pooling
interval within (; ] other than at the top. Suppose that a scheme A has a separate pooling step
(; y] other than the pooling step at the top (z; ]. We construct an alternative scheme A that
replaces pooling with sorting for  2 (; y]. The original market shares under A are a¤ected by A
for  2 (; y]. Given the a¤ected range (; y], the distribution G(; y;A) rst-order stochastically
dominates G(; y;A). We then compare the a¤ected information-rent terms:Z y

(x)dG(; y;A) 
Z y

(x)dG (; y;A)
=
Z y

0(x) [G (; y;A) G(; y;A)] dx > 0:
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Thus, the expected prot is strictly higher under A than under A. This contradicts the optimality
of A.
Step 2: An optimal SPPE cannot have three pooling steps; in particular, it cannot have an
intermediate pooling interval (other than pooling at the bottom and at the top). Since an optimal
SPPE cannot include two separate pooling steps or any sorting interval within [; ] where 0() >
0, and since it cannot have a separate pooling step within (; ] other than at the top, the only
possibility for an optimal SPPE candidate A to have three pooling steps is that the scheme has two
pooling steps, [; y] and (y; z], such that  < y <  < z < . We construct an alternative scheme
A that has two pooling steps, [; y] and (y; z], such that  <  < y < z < . Observe that
M(;A) < M(;A) for  2 [; y] and  2 (y; z] (A12)
M(;A) > M(;A) for  2 (y; y]:
For the a¤ected range [; z], dene the distributions, G(; z;A) and G(; z;A). Since the two
functions have the same xed denominators, we nd
@
@
[G(; z;A) G(; z;A)] = [M(;A) M(;A
)] f()R z
 M(x;A
)f(x)dx
:
Given the inequalities in (A12), the slope of G(; z;A) is atter (steeper) than that of G (; z;A)
at the bottom [; y] and at the top (y; z] (at the intermediate range (y; y]). Thus, in the range
[; z], G(; z;A) crosses G(; z;A) from below other than at the two endpoints,  and z, where
G(; z;A) = G(; z;A). The choice of the point y is made to satisfy  < y < z. If y  , then
G(; z;A) crosses G (; z;A) at type  < , since the slope of G(; z;A) is atter than that of
G (; z;A) in the range (y; z]. If y = z, then G(; z;A) crosses G (; z;A) at the endpoint z > ;
if y = z, then G(; z;A) rst-order stochastically dominates G(; z;A): G(; z;A) < G(; z;A)
for all  2 (; z). It is thus possible to adjust the level of y such that G(; z;A) crosses G(; z;A)
from below at : G(; z;A) < G(; z;A) for  2 (; ) and G(; z;A) > G(; z;A) for  2 (; z).
Given the choice of y, we can compare the two a¤ected information-rent terms:Z z

(x)dG(; z;A) 
Z z

(x)dG (; z;A)
=
Z 

0(x) [G (; z;A) G(; z;A)] dx
+
Z z

0(x) [G (; z;A) G(; z;A)] dx > 0:
The expected prot is strictly higher under A than under A. This is a contradiction for A to be
optimal. Further, note that, other than the pooling at the top, A now includes a separate pooling
step (y; z] within (; ] where 0() < 0. We can then construct another alternative scheme that
replaces pooling with sorting for  2 (y; z] and strictly improves upon the scheme A. Hence, if
() is strictly quasiconcave with a maximizer  2 (; ], then an optimal SPPE cannot have an
intermediate pooling interval.
Step 3: If an intermediate sorting interval, (y; z], is ever used, then it is restricted to a subset of the
range in which 0() < 0:  < y < z < . If a scheme A has three intervals, [; y], (y; z] and (z; ],
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such that y  , then we can construct an alternative scheme A that has three intervals, [; y],
(y; z] and (z; ], such that y > . The alternative scheme lengthens the rst pooling step beyond
the range [; ]. The original market shares under A are a¤ected by A for  2 [; y]. Given
the a¤ected types  2 [; y], dene the distributions, G(; y;A) and G(; y;A). Since A has
one pooling step, M(;A) crosses M(;A) from below, and G(; y;A) rst-order stochastically
dominates G(; y;A). We then compare the a¤ected information-rent terms:Z y

()dG(; y;A) 
Z y

()dG (; y;A)
=
Z 

0() [G (; y;A) G(; y;A)] d
+
Z y

0() [G (; y;A) G(; y;A)] d:
The rst term on the RHS is positive and the second term is negative. We can choose y slightly
above  so that the RHS becomes strictly positive. This nding is conrmed by di¤erentiation of
the RHS with respect to y:Z 

0()
@()
@y
d +
Z y

0()
@()
@y
d + 0(y)(y);
where ()  G (; y;A)   G(; y;A). Note that (y) = 0, and so the third term is zero. If
y approaches  from the right, then the rst term remains positive given @()@y > 0, while the
second term approaches zero. 
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